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# THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND UNANIMITY

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION  
ON CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND UNANIMITY

A thesis Submitted to  
the Graduate School of  
John Carroll University  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the degree of  
Master of Arts

by

Patricia Carbone

1969

The Thesis of Patricia Carbone is hereby accepted:

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## CHAPTER I

### CONCEPTS AND ACTIONS THROUGH 1942

#### Introduction

In the days since 1945, many people in the United States and throughout the Western world have doubted the efficacy of the United Nations as a world organization to keep the peace. Many questions have been asked over and over again by the people in these countries. Why doesn't the United Nations expel the Soviets when they seem to be the main trouble makers in the world? Why did the United States join the United Nations in the first place when it was known there would be no resolution of the power politics question? Why did the United States join the United Nations when its own security would have been better served if it had kept its traditional policy of isolationism? Why were the veto and unanimity clauses included in the Charter when it could be seen that these clauses, in effect, would halt action on the part of the United Nations?

The people have asked these questions in all sincerity and, in the light of recent events, it might seem that their views are the correct ones. It is necessary, therefore, to make an analysis of the fundamental reasons why the United States joined the United Nations at all, or in joining the organization, why the United States did not make it stronger than it is. In making such an analysis we must look at the fundamental viewpoints of the two great powers in the world



today. We must examine their concepts of a world organization. We must see exactly how much of their national sovereignty they were willing to sacrifice. As the question of how much sovereignty was to be given up revolved around the question of great power unanimity and the veto, it is necessary to scrutinize the Russian and American attitudes which lay behind the inclusion of these two principles in the United Nations Charter.

In making such an analysis, it is necessary to go back into history, to see why the Russians and Americans arrived at certain conclusions and principles contained in the United Nations Charter. Such an examination of history will lead to the conclusion that all nations are primarily concerned with the problem of security. In trying to obtain the best security it follows from necessity that each nation must first of all be concerned with its own national security. Because of this primary concern, nations are forced to play power politics.

Cordell Hull once made a statement to this effect:

. . . , our fundamental national interests are - as they always have been - the assuring of our national security and the fostering of the economic and social well-being of our people. To maintain these interests, our foreign policy must necessarily deal with current conditions and must plan for the future in the light of concepts and beliefs which we as a nation accept for ourselves as the guiding lines of our international behavior.<sup>1</sup>

As long as we live in a world of international anarchy, all nations are afraid to let go of their foothold on national security

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<sup>1</sup>Louise W. Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1948), II, p. 237.



until they are assured of international security.<sup>2</sup> This, of course, leads to the playing of power politics. Some people say when speaking of power politics that it fosters international anarchy. When speaking of their own nation's policies, however, these people would say that power politics is synonymous with national defense.<sup>3</sup> Power politics, in the strict sense, however, does not necessarily imply the misuse of power.

With such definitions in mind, we can study the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of the first world war to the end of the second world war and see how the retreat from isolationism on the part of both of these countries was, in reality, a search for greater national security.

#### Post-World War I Concepts and Attitudes of Soviet Russia

##### Concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early Thirties. --

Russia emerged from the first world war with the idea that her national interests could be better served by pursuing a policy of withdrawal from the affairs of Europe. Russian leaders arrived at this conclusion because nothing was gained from Russia's participation in the war. Soviet leaders, after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, concluded that the war had only furthered the interests of the capitalistic nations,

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<sup>2</sup>Vera Micheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York: Whittlesey House, 1946), p. xiii.

<sup>3</sup>Frederick Schuman, "Regionalism and the Spheres of Influence", Peace, Security, and the United Nations, Hans Morgenthau, ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 90.



the industrialists, and the international bankers.<sup>4</sup> The actions of Russia's erstwhile allies, Soviet leaders felt, justified this conclusion. Soviet Russia was not invited to participate in the Paris Peace Conference. Her territory was invaded by the Poles with the tacit consent of the Allies for the purpose of doing away with the revolutionary government. Russian territory in Siberia was invaded, not in theory but in fact, by the Allies to restore the rule of the Czars. This theory of the Soviet rulers was further implemented by the fact that Russia's former territories were not restored to her, and by the fact that the Allies considered the new Soviet government to be a dangerous one and consequently withheld recognition.<sup>5</sup>

Conclusions in regard to the League. -- The Soviet Union's conclusions in regard to the League were reached because of the fear that the League was nothing more than a post-war alliance between the wartime allies to keep the Soviet Union under control. A note from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the League, March 15, 1923, states the viewpoint of the Soviet government:

It regards it (the League) as a coalition of certain states endeavoring to usurp the power over other states and making their attempts on the rights and independence of other nations on a false appearance of groundless legality and in the forms of mandates issued by the Council or . . . the Assembly of the League of Nations . . . The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body really serves as a policy of certain great powers or their vassals. The Soviet Government finds confirmation of its conviction every time that a state assuming the leading role in the League

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<sup>4</sup>Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin (New York: Simon and Schuster, Avon edition, 1967), p. 505; Edward W. Pearlstein, (editor), Revolution in Russian, as reported by the New York Tribune and the New York Herald, 1894-1921 (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), pp. 192-193.

<sup>5</sup>Pearlstein, p. 194.



of Nations makes a decision on international questions touching the interest of the Soviet Republic.<sup>6</sup>

Other statements by the Soviet government reiterated this viewpoint.<sup>7</sup>

Russia still maintained that the League was a farce and held no power because of the militaristic attitudes of the various Western states who were looking for security. She maintained that the League, however, wished to keep up the appearances of functioning and searching for peace by sending out invitations to all nations, including Russia, to join in an international disarmament conference. Soviet Russia accepted the invitation anticipating, of course, that the conference would end in failure. Her purpose in attending the conference was to prove to the world that statements made by her Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, to the effect that total disarmament was the only way to end wars<sup>8</sup> was in reality, a prime consideration in Soviet foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> Litvinov, at the conference, reiterated earlier statements to the effect that total general disarmament was the only way to put an end to wars. He maintained that no other type of disarmament would work because, with weapons, other nations would still look after their security with these weapons. Total disarmament, Litvinov declared, would bring every nation large or small down to the same level. This would

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<sup>6</sup>U. S. Department of State, The United States and the Peace, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 25.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>9</sup>Albert P. Nenarokov, Russia in the Twentieth Century, (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968) p. 249.



make each nation equal in a military sense because no nation would have the power to carry on armed aggression against its neighbors. With the fear of aggression removed, Litvinov said, every nation could feel that at last it had become more secure.<sup>10</sup>

The fact remains, however, that the Soviet Union was seeking total disarmament in furtherance of her own national security. Soviet leaders realized that Russia was still in a weak position, militarily speaking, and these leaders feared collective action on the part of other nations. Total disarmament, therefore, would put the Soviet Union on the same par with other nations in regard to military power. This would leave her free to extend the Marxist-Leninist and later Stalinist brand of Communism beyond her borders by political and economic means without fear of military retaliation.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet Union, following the withdrawal of Germany from the League in 1934, and believing that collective security might be the better course because of the failure of the disarmament conference<sup>12</sup> and believing that active participation in the League would be a deterrent to Germany, the mortal enemy of Russia, joined the League on September 18, 1934, and was given a seat on the League Council.<sup>13</sup> With this willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to

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<sup>10</sup>Maxim Litvinov, The Soviet's Fight for Disarmament (New York: International Publishers, 1932), pp. 11-13.

<sup>11</sup>Robert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin (New York: Simon and Schuster, Avon edition, 1966) p. 589.

<sup>12</sup>Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties, (California: Stanford University Press, 1962) p. 262.

<sup>13</sup>Basil Dmytryshyn, A Concise History of the U.S.S.R., (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965, pp. 202-203.



join the League and the willingness of the Communist party to join in the Popular Front movements in the Western countries, it becomes quite clear that Soviet Russia was interested in creating a balance of power, institutionalized or otherwise, to be directed against a powerful Germany. Soviet Russia was attempting to use the League to stop the creation of a balance of power which might be directed against herself, as well. But the balance of power was again shifting against Russia with the signing of the Four Power Pact of Rome, by Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy in the summer of 1933.<sup>14</sup>

The United States State Department recognized this fact when it made the statement on May 27, 1933, that the pact was:

. . . a veiled attempt to complete the undermining of League prestige, to eliminate the lesser powers from their increasing importance in the councils of Europe, and to establish a sort of Directorate of Four, in which France, deprived of her eastern alliances, and with Russia strictly excluded, would be in a minority of one, while Britain's chronic vacillation would make of Italy the finger on the balance of European power.<sup>15</sup>

This pact was, in effect, the forerunner of the Munich Conference which eventually led to World War II.<sup>16</sup> Several conclusions should have been drawn by Soviet Russia from the signing of this pact, which was never ratified. The Soviet Union should have realized that the Western European powers were still interested in seeing a balance of power created which would contain the U.S.S.R. She should also have seen that the principle of equality of all nations, while true in

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<sup>14</sup>Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago: Rand McNally Company, 1966), p. 312-313.

<sup>15</sup>Morgenthau, p. 76.

<sup>16</sup>Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 279-280.



theory, was never true in fact, and peace and security depended upon a coalition of the great powers who alone were in the position to keep the peace.

Soviet leaders, however, still attempted to use the League as a basis for building a balance of power directed against Germany. The Munich Conference, however, made the Russian leaders realize at last that the Western powers were either too weak to stop Hitler or were planning again to form a Directorate of Four against Russia.<sup>17</sup> The U.S.S.R. consequently began to act unilaterally in order to gain more time to prepare its own defenses and to gain buffer territories between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.<sup>18</sup>

In the event of a European war, Soviet strategists saw two alternatives for the Soviet Union: a war against Germany in which the Soviet Union would be allied with the West or a war between Germany and the West in which the Soviet Union would be neutral.<sup>19</sup> As Soviet Russia doubted the willingness of the Western powers to enter into an effective alliance with the Soviet government, Soviet strategists chose the second alternative: neutral status through an agreement with Nazi Germany.

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<sup>17</sup>Albert Z. Carr, Truman, Stalin and Peace (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1950), p. 124; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1947) p. 283.

<sup>18</sup>August Rei, The Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States: Diplomatic and Other Evidences (London: Boreas Publishing, 1948), p. 9; Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Litvia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 388.

<sup>19</sup>Carr, p. 123.



The Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed on August 23, 1939. The pact contained a secret protocol assigning to each Party "spheres of influence" in the Baltic, Finland, and Poland.<sup>20</sup> When the war in Europe finally broke out, Russia moved against Poland and proceeded to occupy her sphere of influence.<sup>21</sup> Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was all but complete by 1940.<sup>22</sup>

Soviet attempts to bring Finland under control, however, were not successful. In the winter of 1939 the U.S.S.R. declared war on Finland.<sup>23</sup> For her actions against Finland the Soviet Union was branded an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.<sup>24</sup> This action was considered by Moscow as further proof that the Western world was still seeking to create a bloc of nations directed against the U.S.S.R.

Pre-United Nations attitudes. -- When the German attack on Soviet Russia did come, the Soviet leaders were quite willing to join hands with Great Britain and the United States in order to defeat the

<sup>20</sup> Dmytryshyn, p. 207; Slusser and Triska, Theory, Law and Policy, p. 256.

<sup>21</sup> Rei, p. 17; U. S. Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations: 1939-1941, ed. Raymond Sontag and James Beddie (New York: Didier, Publishers, 1948), p. 95.

<sup>22</sup> John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 123.

<sup>23</sup> Alter Brody, et al, War and Peace in Finland: A Documental Survey (New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1940), p. 123; Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy March, 1940-June, 1941, (official Blue-White Book of Finland), p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> Dmytryshyn, p. 213; David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1942), p. 151.



Germans. For this reason the U.S.S.R. sought and obtained lend-lease agreements with the United States.<sup>25</sup> These agreements, the Soviets conceded, would serve world peace and would aid Russia to preserve her national security. The Russians agreed also with the idea that Lend-Lease was a foundation stone for a future world organization in an exchange of telegrams between Soviet and American leaders on the anniversary of the signing of the agreement between the United States government and the Soviet government in 1943.<sup>26</sup> Even as far along as the Yalta Conference in 1945 Stalin declared this to be a fact.<sup>27</sup>

After the Atlantic Charter was made known to the world, the Soviet government expressed agreement with its principles insofar as the Soviet Union was concerned through the Soviet ambassador to England in a statement to the Inter-Allied Meeting in London, September 24, 1941. The statement said in part, that consistent application of the principles expressed in the Charter would be sought by Soviet Russia,<sup>28</sup> that the Soviet Union would advocate collective security against aggressors as a means of advancing the peace and security of the world,<sup>29</sup> and that the Soviet Union would seek to apply the principles of self-determination

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<sup>25</sup>Ivan Maisky, Memories of A Soviet Ambassador, 1939-1943, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 193; Stanley S. Jados, Documents on Russian-American Relations (Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1965), pp. 94-95, 97-98.

<sup>26</sup>Andrew Rothstein, Soviet Policy During the Great Patriotic War (New York: Hutchinson and Company, 1946), I, pp. 224-225, p. 231.

<sup>27</sup>Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York: Doubleday, 1949), p. 220.

<sup>28</sup>U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 13.

<sup>29</sup>Rothstein, I, p. 97.



and the sovereign rights of nations in its search for peace and security.<sup>30</sup> These principles were adhered to by Soviet Russia in several speeches by Stalin, to the peoples of the U.S.S.R.<sup>31</sup> and in various treaties signed by the Soviet government at this time.<sup>32</sup>

When the Soviet leaders set their hands to such documents affirming the principles of the Atlantic Charter,<sup>33</sup> the Soviet Union became a part of the Grand Alliance through which she realized two objectives. Her primary objective at this time was to seek the quickest means for driving the German invader from her soil. The second objective was to have herself recognized as a power on a par with the United States so as to have an equal say in the postwar settlements.<sup>34</sup> With such equality then, the U.S.S.R. could safeguard her own security while advancing her national interests.

By becoming a member of the Grand Alliance the Soviet Union was at last able to realize the long-term objectives she had sought from the twenties. The U.S.S.R. had sought to become an equal of the United States and to be recognized as such. For this reason the U.S.S.R. had entered the League of Nations and had argued so steadfastly for total disarmament. The Soviet Union had sought to keep aggressor nations away from her borders. For this reason she entered into various non-aggression pacts. The Soviet Union also sought to maintain and extend her spheres of influence without fear of retaliation on the

<sup>30</sup>The United States and the Peace, p. 41.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Jados, Documents, p. 87.

<sup>34</sup>Nenarokov, p. 250.



part of other nations. For this reason the U.S.S.R. had proposed total military disarmament, gained a seat on the League Council, taken over her Baltic neighbors, and signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which split eastern Europe into two spheres of influence.

# Post-World War I Concepts and Attitudes of the United States

American concepts and attitudes in the Twenties and early Thirties. -- The United States, too, felt that she had gained nothing from participation in the war, a war which was not to make the world safe for democracy, but a war which was only to further the interests of her former allies. She felt that she had gained nothing from the war but a huge amount of indebtedness on the part of her former allies and that these debts would never be paid. Coupled with this feeling was the feeling of "Back to Normalcy". To use Calvin Coolidge's expression, "America's business was business". The United States began to pursue a "live alone and like it" policy.<sup>35</sup>

The policies of the United States government became very evident in its attitude toward the League. Warren Harding expressed the viewpoint of the Administration when he said that the League would cause the United States government to surrender to a dangerous extent its independence of action, if the United Nations joined the League.<sup>36</sup> There were, however, quite a number of Republican leaders including Herbert Hoover who disagreed with Administration policy, and said that

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<sup>35</sup>Marquis Childs and William Stone, Toward a Dynamic America (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1943), p. 16.

<sup>36</sup>Ruhl Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947), p. 481.



the United States should join some sort of world organization.<sup>37</sup>

Other Republican leaders, in the "Statement of 31", said that the United States should join the League, but believed in making changes in the League for the preservation of United States rights.<sup>38</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge, Senior, believed the United States should join an organization composed of nations whose vital interests were in the zones of the North Atlantic or that the United States should join in alliance with Great Britain and France in order to protect those vital interests.<sup>39</sup>

It was for this purpose that the Lodge reservation, Article 2 of which said that the United States should have no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation, nor to interfere in controversies between nations, nor to employ military or naval forces without the consent of Congress, and Article 4 of which said, that the United States should have the right to judge what questions of security were to remain within United States jurisdiction, were introduced into the Senate.<sup>40</sup> But, due to Wilson's desire for a universal organization, Lodge's desire for a limited organization or an alliance, and the isolationists' desire for no United States participation in any sort of organization, both the League and the Lodge resolutions were rejected by the Senate.<sup>41</sup> The period of the twenties became one in which Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 470.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Barlett, pp. 470-471.



State for Harding, refused to answer any and all correspondence from the League and one in which United States observers at Geneva were instructed not to enter any building under League authority.<sup>42</sup> The attitude, therefore, in the United States was that the country should follow the advice of its first president and avoid entangling alliances which, in the long run, would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

American action in conjunction with the League of Nations. --

The attitude of the United States government changed slightly in the late twenties and early thirties for although the United States did not join the League and the government maintained its former position in regard to it, the United States government did send various representatives to join in conferences when the national interests were involved. The United States sponsored the Washington Conference of 1922, took part in the London Naval Conference of 1930, signed the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, promulgated the Moratorium for the payment of international debts in 1930, and implemented League action in regard to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.<sup>43</sup> The United States official attitude, however, continued to be one of smugness and "to the devil with Europe". Governmental policy was best expressed in a statement made in Cleveland by the Under-Secretary of State, William R. Castle, October 27, 1932. "We have always to think of just one thing - what is the interest of the United States."<sup>44</sup> The United States at this time felt that she

<sup>42</sup>Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century, 1946), p. 481.

<sup>43</sup>John A. Krout, United States since 1865 (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1958), pp. 185-188.

<sup>44</sup>William R. Castle, Press Releases No. 391 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1932).



could still act alone in the maintenance of her national security.

New International cooperation. -- It became increasingly evident to the new Roosevelt administration, however, that the best course of American policy lay in international cooperation, in the best interests of American security rather than in isolationism. This cooperation was to be only regional in scope, however, because American vital interests, for the most part, lay within the Western Hemisphere. This cooperation was to be mainly for the strengthening of the Monroe Doctrine. In December, 1936, the principle that an act of disturbing the peace of any one American republic affected all the American republics was subscribed to by the United States government delegate at the Pan-American Conference.<sup>45</sup> President Roosevelt tried to broaden this principle in his famous "Quarantine Speech" of 1937<sup>46</sup> and in a radio address on September 3, 1939, the date of the opening of the second world war.<sup>47</sup>

It must not be supposed, however that the United States in the early period of the Roosevelt administration was willing or ready to join an international organization which would jeopardize its freedom of action. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, made this quite clear in a radio address delivered at Washington, March 17, 1938.<sup>48</sup> America was still not ready to take an active part in suppressing acts of aggressor nations which threatened the peace and security of the entire world.

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<sup>45</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 13.

<sup>46</sup>Bartlett, p. 577.

<sup>47</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 16.

<sup>48</sup>U.S. Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 407-419.



Effects of German expansion and aggression. -- While America during this period was pursuing a policy of cooperation without action, affairs in Europe were drawing to a climax. Germany and Italy had begun their march and the Western democracies pursued a policy of appeasement. Germany marched into the Rhineland and Austria, and Italy into Ethiopia.<sup>49</sup> The policy of collective security was no longer considered to be in force by the Western democracies as they pursued their policy of appeasement. Appeasement reached its zenith at Munich in the fall of 1938.<sup>50</sup> The Western powers, still believing that Hitler would maintain the status quo after his demands on Czechoslovakia were achieved, and still believing that he would be a vital factor in the creation of a balance of power against Soviet Russia, allowed Hitler to carry out his dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in order to gain "peace in our time".<sup>51</sup>

It was only in the summer of 1940 with the fall of the Lowlands, Scandinavia, and France that the United States began to realize that German aggression threatened both the Western Hemisphere and its own national security, and that the United States, of necessity, must cooperate with the forces arrayed against Hitler. For this reason President Roosevelt, by executive agreement, negotiated the transfer of fifty old-age destroyers to Britain in return for the right to lease naval bases.<sup>52</sup> Although the transfer was consummated in the name of

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<sup>49</sup>Churchill, pp. 268-271.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 300.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 318

<sup>52</sup>Krout, U.S. Since 1865., p. 211.



national defense, it marked the beginning of active cooperation on the part of the United States to put down aggression in the world.

Further aid to those forces resisting German aggression was sought by the president when he asked the Congress on January 6, 1941, for quick enactment of a lend-lease program. The president told the Congress that the United States was:

. . . committed to full support of all those resolute people, everywhere, who are resisting aggression and thereby keeping war away from our own hemisphere. By this support . . .<sup>53</sup> we strengthen the defense and security of our own nation.

It was not until March 11, 1941, that Congress passed such an act. On the basis of this act, lend-lease agreements were concluded with several nations who were fighting against the Germans. The "master agreement" signed with Britain served as the model for agreements signed with other countries including the one signed with Moscow in the summer of 1942.<sup>54</sup>

Although Prime Minister Churchill never admitted the fact,<sup>55</sup> the Lend-Lease Agreements promulgated by the United States were a foundation stone for the future world organization. When Foreign Minister Molotov visited Washington on May 29, 1942, the subject for discussion was the lend-lease agreement soon to be signed between his government and that of the United States, and how those agreements might further the maintenance of peace and security for the freedom-loving nations after the war.<sup>56</sup> Dean Acheson, the Assistant Secretary

<sup>53</sup>Bartlett, p. 607.

<sup>54</sup>Rothstein, I, pp. 162-165.

<sup>55</sup>Raymond Dennet and Robert Turner, Documents on American Foreign Policy (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1945 --), VIII, p. 839.

<sup>56</sup>Rothstein, I, pp. 166-167.



of State, in a speech on July 6, 1942, said that the Lend-Lease Agreements were not made by the United States to seek profit or return on investment, but were made in the interests of national security. National security, he declared, in turn rested on national peace. These agreements would serve the peace by enabling the Big Four to work in cooperation with one another towards the establishment of a peaceful world.<sup>57</sup>

Closely allied with lend-lease as one of the foundations of the United Nations Organization was the meeting which took place between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the Atlantic Ocean in the summer of 1941. At this meeting decisions concerning aid to Soviet Russia took place between Churchill and Roosevelt, and a telegram was sent to Stalin officially suggesting a meeting on the apportionment of joint resources.<sup>58</sup>

It was at this Atlantic meeting that the Atlantic Charter was drawn up. This Charter contained the "Four Freedoms", the original foundation of the United Nations.<sup>59</sup> This conference although it was held for the primary purpose of coordinating American defense efforts in the Western Hemisphere with British defense efforts on the continent of Europe, was the forerunner for the various meetings to be held between the leaders of the United States and the other governments of the United Nations for the purpose of seeking ways and means to

<sup>57</sup>Holborn, I, 97.

<sup>58</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy, p. 49. On this suggestion a meeting took place between the representatives of the Big Three the following September.

<sup>59</sup>Henry Littlefield, New Outline-History of Europe 1815-1942 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1942), p. 259.



defeat the Axis nations and for the purpose of promoting plans for an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

Continued American adherence to the Atlantic Charter as the guiding objective of the United States in all postwar settlements was given by the president on December 21, 1944, when he declared, "The Atlantic Charter is just as valid today as when it was pronounced in 1941."<sup>60</sup>

It becomes evident, therefore, that both the United States and the Soviet Union were in full accord with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, but for different reasons. The United States believed that promulgation of such principles on its part would aid the future peace and security of the world, as not only England but the smaller nations of the world would come to realize that the United States had their interests at heart. Common interests would lead to common security. Common security would lead to a common international organization.

#### Summation of Soviet and American Security Objectives in the Twenties and Thirties

Soviet objectives. -- This examination of the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union during the twenties and thirties has shown the principle security objectives of both countries. To some extent the future objectives of both of these countries have also been shown. Past Soviet objectives are the same as those of the present, and future. The U.S.S.R's primary objective was to halt German aggression by the creation of a balance of power, institutionalized or otherwise. The Soviet Union's other main objectives were to

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<sup>60</sup> Dennet and Turner, VI, 287.

become an equal of the United States, and to expand the influence of Communism throughout the world without fear of retaliation from other nations.

American objectives. -- The prime objective of the United States in this period was to stop all aggression which threatened the vital interests in the North Atlantic area. Co-terminous with this objective was the objective of protecting the Western Hemisphere from attack. America in this period was not willing to enter into entangling alliances which might have affected its sovereignty or its freedom of action in the international sphere. For the future, the first two objectives remained the same, but due to the heavy naval losses of Britain during World War II, America found herself taking on added responsibilities. The United States has increasingly had to fill the gap left by the power vacuum in Western Europe after World War II. The United States then of necessity has had to enter into various organizations and alliances, the most important organization being the United Nations.



## CHAPTER II

### CONFERENCES AND PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION JULY, 1943 - JANUARY, 1945

#### Foundation Stones for World Organization

The Moscow Conference -- It was this search for security on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States which led to the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of the Big Three in 1943. Stalin was interested in an alliance of the Big Three in order to find and keep the peace and to further his own ideas of national security.<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt and Churchill felt that the establishment of a world organization would be for their own best interests because the common interests of most of the nations of the world would be in accord with their own interests. In this way the two great Western powers felt they could achieve national security.

The Moscow Conference marked a turning point for the United States, Great Britain, and Russia for it was the first time the Grand Alliance became institutionalized.<sup>2</sup> It was at this conference that these three countries agreed that Big Three unanimity which was a reality in the war must be continued into the postwar world so that each nation could reach its objectives in concert with the other two and yet not be hampered by restrictions on national sovereignty. These leaders, therefore, came to the conclusion that an international organization

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<sup>1</sup>Stettinius, p. 296.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



based on the principles of national sovereignty and on the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter must be established. A joint communique to this effect was issued simultaneously by the governments of the Big Three on October 30, 1943,<sup>3</sup> and in the "Declaration of the Four Nations", issued on November 1, 1943.<sup>4</sup>

The Conference also marked a turning point in the foreign affairs of both the United States and Russia for it was the first time that either of these two countries were agreed on the fact that peace and security depended upon some kind of world organization which required their active participation.<sup>5</sup> The Declaration also marked a turning point in international affairs for, although it recognized the fact that all nations both great and small should be members of a world organization, it stated the fact that general peace and security depended, for the most part, on the joint action of the big powers.

The Declaration was not just a statement issued by the governments concerned which could be ignored at a later date. This, at least, was the opinion of the United States government for it proposed on November 18, 1943, if the other governments approved, that the four parties to the Moscow Declaration would welcome all peace-loving states to the establishment of a general international organization. This proposal received the approval of the Russian government only, but in

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<sup>3</sup>Rothstein, II, p. 241

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Cairo and Yalta, 1943, p. 387; The United States and the Peace, pp. 5-7.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



November, 1943, the British gave oral consent to the suggestion by asking the State Department about methods of procedure in setting up a world organization.<sup>6</sup>

Teheran. -- At Teheran the leaders of the Big Three met in November, 1943 to discuss methods of peace. Again it was stated that there should be a general international organization which would prevent the outbreak of such wars as were being waged while the conference was in session.<sup>7</sup> No commitments were made by any of the three leaders at this time, in the realm of world politics and organization,<sup>8</sup> although both Roosevelt and Stalin had discussed in general terms the type of organization to be erected.

Roosevelt's conception of an international organization was that it should be composed of three main bodies. The first body was to be an Assembly of all the members of the United Nations from all over the world. The second body was to be the Executive Committee consisting of the Big Four plus the representatives of two European nations, one South American nation, one Middle Eastern nation, one Far Eastern nation, and one British dominion. This executive committee would deal with all non-military questions. The third body, as set forth by Roosevelt, was to be the "Four Policemen" which was to be

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<sup>6</sup>U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 246-247.

<sup>7</sup>James P. Warburg, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 211.

<sup>8</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 200.



the enforcing agency. The United States was to provide only naval and air forces for that agency.<sup>9</sup>

By Stalin's questioning, following Roosevelt's explanation, it can be seen that Stalin was vitally interested as to whether decisions of the executive body would be binding, and that he regarded the European area as vitally important, more so than Asia.<sup>10</sup>

There seems to have been no discussion between the two leaders as to the possibility that an aggressor nation might be one of the Big Four.

Roosevelt returned to this country and in his "State of the Union" message of January, 1944, made it clear to the Congress that national security was his main concern at both the Moscow and the Teheran Conferences:

The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each nation individually and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in the one word: Security.

And that means not only physical security, which provides safety from attack by aggressors, but also means economic security, social security, and moral security--in a family of nations.<sup>11</sup>

With the end of these conferences, the underlying ideas of the future United Nations Organization had been formed. The United Nations Declaration of January, 1942, formed the wartime coalition of the great powers. The Moscow Conference made it clear that the great powers thought it necessary to establish a world organization.

<sup>9</sup>Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper Brothers, 1948), p. 785; U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, pp. 530-531.

<sup>10</sup>Sherwood, pp. 785-786.

<sup>11</sup>Holborn, p. 259.



At Teheran it was realized that it was the responsibility of the Big Four, in particular, and of all the United Nations to make the peace.<sup>12</sup>

When it became evident that the Big Four were agreed on the idea of a general international organization, it was imperative that preparation should be made and plans drawn up by the various leaders, embodying their ideas on the function and organization of such a body.

The groundwork for a definite international organization with active participation on the part of the United States had already been laid before the Moscow Conference. On September 7, 1943, a conference of Republican leaders at Mackinac Island, Michigan, endorsed United States participation in a postwar world organization.<sup>13</sup> This endorsement was translated into legislative action on the part of Congress with the passage of the Fulbright resolution<sup>14</sup> on September 21, 1943, and the passage of the Connally resolution<sup>15</sup> on November 5, 1943.

#### Plans for World Organization

United States plans. -- Both the United States and Russia were working on plans for a world organization in this period. The United States had presented five plans to either the president or

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<sup>12</sup>Leland Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (2d ed.; Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 4-5.

<sup>13</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 196.

<sup>14</sup>The United States and the Peace, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 8

the secretary of state in the period extending from July 14, 1943 to July 18, 1944.<sup>16</sup>

The absolute veto principle, that is, the principle of allowing one permanent member to cast a negative vote to halt action, on all matters concerning enforcement action and on all matters of pacific settlement was contained in only one plan, that of July 14, 1943.<sup>17</sup> The absolute protective veto principle, that is, the principle of allowing one permanent member to cast a negative vote on all enforcement matters in order to protect that nation's sovereignty on the use of its troops, to protect that nation's sovereignty in matters of domestic jurisdiction, to protect that nation's satellites, was included in all the other plans. Provision was made in all the other plans that abstaining members were to be obligated by the majority decision.<sup>18</sup> In the December 29 plan the vote of a party on the Council and involved in a dispute was not to be counted.<sup>19</sup> In the July 18, 1944, plan provisions were to be made later in case one or more of the permanent members was a party to a dispute.<sup>20</sup>

All of these plans recognized that the Big Four must be unanimous in decisions relating to the determination of threats to the peace, terms of settlement for disputes in which they were not involved, measures of enforcement, regulation of armaments, and, in the

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<sup>16</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 473.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 473.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 473-495.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 534.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 595.



last analysis, where sovereignty was to lie. All of these plans recognized the right of veto on these matters as a prerogative of the great powers.

These plans showed the world that the United States was still fearful for its own peace, security, and sovereignty, but that the United States was willing to join an international organization which would not circumscribe her sovereignty and security. These plans did show the world that the United States was more willing than was the Soviet Union to allow the international organization to make decisions to which she could subscribe without a loss of freedom of action. Four of these plans did limit the unanimity principle to the extent that an abstaining power would be bound by the decision of the other members of the Council.

Soviet plans. -- The Russians, too, were interested in plans for an international organization. But they desired an international organization constructed in such a manner as would allow them to retain their national sovereignty and independence of action in international and domestic affairs.

The Soviet Union had stated her desire to join an international organization as early as 1942.<sup>21</sup> But it was not until after the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, which left unsettled the question of voting, that the Russians began to set forth ideas on exactly what their plans for a world organization might be. As Joseph Stalin said in a speech to the Russian people on November 6, 1944, security was the main problem for the Russian leaders.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Holborn, I, p. 365; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, I, p. 1050.

<sup>22</sup>Rothstein, II, pp. 31-32.



This speech set the pattern for more elaborate plans which appeared in various official organs of the Russian government. The Soviet leaders were primarily concerned with creating an organization whose prime purpose would be to obviate the recurrence of German aggression with a view to avoiding the mistakes of the Allies following the first world war. The future organization must be built on the agreement, unanimity, and close cooperation of the great powers of the anti-German coalition.<sup>23</sup> Several articles made it abundantly clear that the Soviet Union would not participate in any international organization patterned after the defunct League, the reason being that the Soviet Union would not agree to join an international organization which could later be used against her, as was the case in the League.

One Soviet writer proposed that in the future world organization the leading and decisive role be played by the big powers who would assume active leadership, and who would form the central element of the organization. These great powers, this writer continued, must assume the obligation to resist aggression, if necessary, with their armed forces alone, irrespective of the attitudes of the other members of the organization. This, of course, meant that the responsibility for maintaining peace would rest not within an impersonal organization or with fifty or sixty nations, but would rest within an organization headed by a league of the great powers. Such a league would, of necessity, in matters concerning the direction of the organization, and in matters of important nature, mean unanimity among the members of the league. In order to put their decisions into effect, it

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<sup>23</sup>Rothstein, II, pp. 31-32.



was this writer's opinion that these countries ought to be given, in a constitutional fashion, formal authority appropriate to their real and de facto obligations.<sup>24</sup> This writer felt that aggression must be stopped in the shortest possible time, but he did not favor big, independent armies. The best way to stop aggression, he stated, was to have an air force which could be under international control.<sup>25</sup>

This same writer went on to say that the Soviets did not agree to the principle of unanimity in the League of Nations because what was thought to be unanimity was, in reality, a lack of it. One nation could stop any action to be taken on the part of the League, no matter what was the size of that nation. Big Five unanimity would be different because they would have a common purpose and interests, because they would act quickly in an emergency, and would not be stopped in their actions by a vote of a small power.<sup>26</sup>

Another writer of the Soviet Union maintained the principle of unanimity and accord between the great powers was necessary because they alone possessed the resources to keep the peace. In any future organization, however, the principle of national sovereignty must be maintained and a permanent member must, therefore, be allowed to vote on questions concerning that nation's self-interest. This writer maintained further that Soviet juristic thought had always paid more

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<sup>24</sup>Charles Prince, "Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization of Security, Cooperation, and International Law", AJIL, 39, September, 1945, pp. 452-453.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 453.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 453.



attention to geopolitics and economics, rather than law, and that the Soviet validated all its actions on these grounds.<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet Union could not depend upon the fiction of "legality" in any future organization because some nations who might become members of that organization might be nations who refused to recognize or would refuse to recognize the Soviet Union. If this were the case, the Soviet Union could see no reason why she could rely on the impartiality of "decisions" of these nations.<sup>28</sup>

It becomes obvious that the Soviet Union was interested in only some of the same concepts for a world organization which interested the United States. The Soviet leaders were interested in joint cooperation and unanimity among the great powers as a deterrent to future German aggression, but Stalin recognized the importance of keeping Russian national interests protected and for this reason demanded the absolute veto on matters vitally affecting these interests.

Soviet concepts were different from American concepts in regard to the type of organization to be established. Whereas the Americans desired an organization in which the small powers would be included and would have some function in the maintenance of world peace, the Soviet leaders felt that the world organization should be controlled by the big powers, and the smaller nations should accept without question the authority of those powers.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 455.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 458.

<sup>29</sup>Jados, Documents, p. 145.



It was a known fact that the Russians vehemently opposed any such plan which would not allow the great powers to completely dominate the new organization, and although the Soviets were careful to safeguard their own sovereignty, they did not want the lesser powers to exercise their sovereignty to such an extent that a great bloc of national votes could be used against them.<sup>30</sup> For this reason they could not agree to any voting plan on a straight national basis which might put the Soviet Union in the minority.

They agreed, however, with the United States that this association of big powers would be intrusted not only with efforts to achieve a peace over the common foe, but would also be intrusted with the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and the establishment of economic, political and cultural cooperation among nations.

#### Dumbarton Oaks

##### Agreement on absolute protective veto on enforcement measures.---

The United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement on most of the purposes, functions, and obligations of the proposed organization. Because of this, and because the American proposals were most complete, both the Soviets and the British accepted the American position as the basis for discussion at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington, D.C.<sup>31</sup>

None of the four major powers was willing to accept at Dumbarton Oaks the straight majority vote on substantive questions, for such a

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>31</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 315; Krout, p. 233.



vote would mean that the armed forces of any nation could be used without its consent, that decisions could be reached which would adversely affect one of the great powers without its consent, and that economic sanctions could be applied against one of the great powers or its satellites without that power's consent.<sup>32</sup>

Disagreement on abstention. -- The disagreement between the Russians and Americans revolved around the question of whether members of the Security Council that were parties to a dispute, including disputes involving the use of sanctions, including the parties that were major nations with permanent membership on the Council, would have the right to vote or to be required to abstain from voting in decisions by the Council on the dispute.<sup>33</sup> This question was fundamental to the rights and obligations of members in the organization, and to the basic principles on which the organization would function.

The British came to Dumbarton Oaks with the view that the votes of any party to any dispute would not be taken into account, as was the case in all matters in the League. The American position was that a permanent member, like a non-permanent, should not vote in connection with any dispute to which it was a party. The Soviet representatives held the contrary view for they felt that, on any matter concerning their vital interests, they should be able to protect those interests at all costs.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Jados, p. 146; Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Publisher, 1962), p. 624.

<sup>33</sup>Jados, p. 150; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, p. 302-303.

<sup>34</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 317.



It became increasingly evident throughout the Dumbarton Oaks discussions that this question would not or could not be resolved. Recognition of such a right as reserved by the Soviets would, in effect, signify an absolute veto by a major power that was a party in such a matter. Soviet insistence that the right of absolute veto be kept by the major powers in such cases was voiced from the start of the matter's consideration and when it continued unmodified, Secretary of State Hull discussed the matter with the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, without avail.

Gromyko, while informed by Roosevelt that the United States would agree to a simple majority of the eleven members of the Council on matters of procedure, was also informed that the American people would never agree to the great powers possessing an absolute veto as demanded by the Russians, for it was the American concept of justice that a litigant should never be able to decide his own case. Gromyko was also informed that the smaller nations would never agree to the Russian proposal. Gromyko remained adamant in his viewpoint in regard to the absolute veto.<sup>35</sup>

Roosevelt, on the advice of Hull, sent Stalin a cablegram expressing the American viewpoint. Stalin replied negatively to the cablegram, saying that he believed in the unanimity of the great powers in all matters. He did say that he would not object to an effort to work out a special formula for disputes not involving sanctions.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Stettinius, pp. 20-22.; Leopold, p. 628.

<sup>36</sup>Stettinius, p. 17. (Such a formula was later worked out by the State Department and sent to Churchill and Stalin December 5, 1944, and later agreed upon at Yalta.); Jados, Documents, p. 150.



When Andrei Gromyko stated his government's final position, it posed the question whether to continue the Conversations in an effort to resolve the issue. The United States offered one last compromise proposal but even this was rejected by the Soviet representative.<sup>37</sup> On the 17th of September after a conference with Hull, Stettinius talked with Gromyko to get a change of position. He also talked with Alexander Cadogan, the British representative, about the whole affair, but the Soviet representative remained firm.<sup>38</sup>

#### The Failure of the Voting Question

Gromyko stated that an agreement by his government on any date for a general conference of the United Nations would depend upon whether the British and American governments would accept the Soviet position on voting in the Security Council, and agreement on the proposal that all Soviet Republics be initial members of the organization. On the first of these proposals the explanation was made that the Soviet government continued to consider that the principle of unanimity of the four great powers must be carried out unconditionally; on the second, no explanation was given.<sup>39</sup> It was decided to leave the chapter on voting procedure open for discussion at a later date.

Even with this vital problem left unsettled, it was felt that the Conversations were successful and steps taken in the right direction toward the establishment of an international organization.

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<sup>37</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 324.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 327.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 328.



It was thought a certainty that the differences left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks would not remain unsettled. Stalin pointed this out when he said,

"The surprising thing is not that differences exist, but that there are so few of them, and, that as a rule, in practically every case they are resolved . . ."40

The conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the publication by the participating governments of the "Tentative Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization" represented the first important step in the implementation of the general policy expressed in the Moscow Four Power Declaration, the Teheran Conference, and the numerous statements of President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.

Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the question on voting which remained unsettled was fraught with difficulty. The representatives of Great Britain and the United States were willing to make some concessions to Russia in regard to the voting question, but they were not willing to make the concessions that the Soviet Union desired.

Roosevelt, accordingly, sent telegrams on December 5 and 6, 1944, to Stalin in the form of a message conveyed through Ambassador Harriman, who asked to discuss the voting question with Stalin. The telegram suggested an early meeting between the heads of the three governments to iron out the difficulties which had arisen. Harriman, however, did

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid, p. 337.



not get to see Stalin until December 14. Stalin told Harriman that he needed more time to study the proposals.<sup>41</sup>

But even with the announcement of the United States proposal, the sending of the telegram, and the meeting between Harriman and Stalin, the Soviets remained adamant. Stalin replied to Roosevelt's telegram by saying that he saw no possibility of agreeing to the proposed formula.<sup>42</sup>

Vandenberg works for organization. -- The rejection by Stalin of the proposed voting formula was taken by many to mean a failure, before it was even born, of a world organization. Many leaders in the United States did not take such a dim view, however. Senator Vandenberg declared on January 10, 1945, during a debate on foreign policy in the United States senate that the United States still proposed

" . . . to help create a post-war world on a basis which shall stop aggressors for keeps, and, so far as is humanly possible, substitute justice for force among free men. We propose to do it primarily for our own sake"

and that the United States would be willing to join in an "alliance" with Britain and Russia for this purpose. He continued in this same speech,

" . . . I want a new dignity and a new authority for international law. I think that American self-interest requires it."

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 381.; Jados, p. 152-153; Stettinius, p. 22.

<sup>42</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 382.



He declared that real self-interest lies in collective security,<sup>43</sup> an idea which the Russians were proclaiming to the world in pre-war days. By analyzing these remarks, it can be seen that Vandenberg was quite close to the Russian concept of unanimity. It can be seen that Vandenberg envisaged the new world organization as a continuation of the wartime grand alliance to stop aggression by any country excepting the Big Five, as the wartime grand alliance had stopped the aggression of Germany, Japan, and Italy, by united action. These views were not far from the views held by the senior Henry Cabot Lodge.<sup>44</sup> By Vandenberg's remarks, it can be seen also that he was in agreement with the Russian viewpoint in that he felt the interests of this country were paramount in setting up any such world organization.

United States Proposal of January 15, 1945  
on Voting

When the Administration leaders became certain, because of Senator Vandenberg's remarks, that both Republicans and Democrats were willing to join in an international organization to safeguard American interests and security, they worked all the harder for a solution to the voting problem. In January, 1945, copies of a paper containing the United States' ideas on what should be the substantive and procedural decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote were given informally to the British and Soviet ambassadors in Washington.

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<sup>43</sup>The United States and the Peace, pp. 30-31.

<sup>44</sup>Samuel Flagg Bemis, The United States as a World Power (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), pp. 174-175.



Qualified veto in pacific settlement. -- The paper said that on an affirmative vote of seven members, including the permanent members of the Council would be required, except that in an event a permanent member was a party to a dispute or situation before the Council, that member should not be allowed to vote in decisions listed under "Promotion of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes". These would include questions as to whether a dispute or a situation brought before the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace, whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice, whether the Council should make recommendations to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement, whether legal aspects of the matter before it (the Council) should be referred to the International Court, and whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.<sup>45</sup>

New role of enforcement agencies. -- This proposal was different from the earlier United States proposals in that the earlier proposals took no account of other existing agencies which could be used to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Absolute protective veto on substantive matters. -- On all other substantive matters not dealing with pacific settlement absolute unanimity would be required among the permanent members.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 654.; U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 772.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.



### CHAPTER III

#### YALTA AND SAN FRANCISCO

##### The Yalta Conference

Conference arrangements. -- It was important that some avenue of compromise was left open, and the suggestion was made and agreed upon that the leaders of the Big Three get together and discuss the problem of voting, along with other wartime problems, at Yalta.

The leaders in all three countries were positive that an organization which would place in the hands of the Grand Alliance ultimate powers of peace and security must come into being if only to safeguard their own national interests and security. These leaders, therefore, were willing to go to great lengths to work out these problems on the highest level.

It was perhaps this feeling of common necessity that the Yalta Conference marked the high tide of British, Soviet, and American cooperation on the war and postwar settlements.<sup>1</sup> The leaders of the three countries were sure that the deadlock on the voting problem could be broken at Yalta because the conference constituted a stage of discussion on the highest policy level while the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations constituted a stage of decisions on the highest technical level.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Stettinius, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 393.



The surprising thing is that, although the conference was of such an important nature, there is no single official record of the meetings. The Soviets, who made all the arrangements for the conference, felt that pressure would not be applied to the policy makers if such a record was not kept. They also felt a more friendly feeling might prevail both during the conference and afterwards if words that were uttered in haste at the conference were not taken down verbatim. The only reliable source as to what took place at the conference comes from those men who were at the conference, took notes, and later wrote about the conference.<sup>3</sup>

The only full-length discussion of the voting problem took place on February 6, 1945, in Livadia Palace. It was at this meeting that Secretary of State Stettinius gave an explanation to the three leaders of the proposed voting formula which had been sent to the three ambassadors of those countries the preceding December.<sup>4</sup>

Basic conceptual differences. -- Both Roosevelt and Stalin had made clear their positions on the matter of voting and on the matter of world organization in general. Their positions had been made quite clear long before the Yalta Conference by plans, speeches, statements, and documents put forward by themselves and their associates. Roosevelt thought the most important thing was to keep the unity of the great powers for the purpose of defeating Germany and then to get the great powers around a conference table to work out a

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<sup>3</sup>Stettinius, p. 104.

<sup>4</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 395.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 735.



world organization which would grant to these powers the major part in keeping the peace, but which at the same time would give the small nations some voice in their destiny.<sup>5</sup> The American concepts would have placed a limitation on the great powers' use of the veto in matters of pacific settlement.

The Soviets were of a mind that unanimity among the great powers should be kept both during and after the war so that a recurrence of aggression on the part of Germany or any other nation, excluding the Big Four, which might desire to pursue the same course would not be possible. To this extent, the Russians agreed with the American viewpoint. But the Soviet Union deviated from the American viewpoint on the type of world organization to be set up. The U.S.S.R. was primarily concerned with a world organization which would be run solely by the big powers. It was because of this basic difference in concepts that no solution thus far had been worked out on the voting problem.

Even at Yalta, the basic difference in concepts was shown by the statement of the various leaders. Joseph Stalin made it quite clear that the three great powers which had borne the brunt of the war should be the ones to preserve the peace. He said it was ridiculous that the small powers should have the same voice as the Big Three. He was prepared, he declared, to join with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers, but he would never agree to having any action of the Big Powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers.

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<sup>5</sup>Stettinius, p. 188.



"Yugoslavia, Albania, and such small countries do not deserve to be at this table . . . We three have to decide how to keep the peace of the world, and it will not be kept unless we three decide to do it."<sup>6</sup>

Presentation of the American viewpoint. -- The American Position on Voting was read at the Third Formal Meeting of the Yalta Conference.<sup>7</sup> The American viewpoint stated that there should be absolute unanimity among the great powers on enforcement measures for the preservation of peace with a provision for a fair hearing for all members of the Organization. It was the viewpoint of the United States that on pacific settlements of disputes, a qualified voting system be used, so as not to block investigation of such a dispute in the Council. It was held that these proposals provided a reasonable, solution to the whole problem, at the same time combining in a satisfactory manner the basic concepts<sup>8</sup> of the United States leaders and its people.<sup>9</sup>

It may be argued that the principle of the absolute protective veto as set forth in the American proposal was contrary to American standards of justice, but Roosevelt, remembering Wilson's troubles with the Senate in regard to the League, and keeping in mind that the Charter would eventually be submitted to the Senate for ratification, was particularly conscious of the importance of this type of veto

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 112.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1943, p. 589.

<sup>7</sup>Appendix I.

<sup>8</sup>Stettinius, p. 142.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 196.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1943, p. 662.



as a form of insurance against commitment of American forces, and as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected.<sup>10</sup>

Explanation of effect of the formula. -- At this session of the conference Stettinius gave an explanation of the American proposals on decisions of the Security Council. The Secretary explained that there were some decisions which would require the affirmative votes of the seven members of the Security Council, except that a member could not cast its vote in any such decisions that concerned disputes to which it was a part.<sup>11</sup>

The idea of the American proposal was that any member that was a party to the dispute should abstain from voting on decisions relating to that dispute as long as the decisions referred to pacific settlement or peaceful adjustment - the qualified veto. On the other hand, decisions relating to the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, and decisions to use enforcement measures would, in all cases, require the unanimous agreement of all the permanent members, even the parties to a dispute - the absolute protective veto.<sup>12</sup> Only procedural matters would require a simple majority of any seven members of the Council.

Soviet adherence to the formula. -- After these explanations concerning the American proposal were given the meeting was adjourned at the request of Stalin to give the Soviet delegation time to study

<sup>10</sup>Sherwood, p. 855; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, p. 803, 811.

<sup>11</sup>Stettinius, p. 143.

<sup>12</sup>Stettinius, p. 45.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, pp. 943-944.



the proposals in the light of the American explanation.<sup>13</sup> Stalin agreed to the voting formula as presented by the Americans and agreed with the Americans that their voting formula would indeed keep the great powers united.<sup>14</sup>

Concessions Made in Regard  
to the Voting Formula

Soviet concession on the qualified veto. -- Stalin's concession to America was that he agreed to that part of the voting formula in which it was implicit that a major power could not by its veto prevent the Council from considering a dispute falling under pacific settlement, even though such consideration would advertise the involvement of said power in the dispute.<sup>15</sup> Stalin felt that the absolute protective veto would thoroughly protect Russia's vital interests. This concession on the part of the Soviet Union came about because the United States, in another phase of the Yalta Conferences, admitted Russia's traditional position as a Pacific power.<sup>16</sup>

American concession on the absolute protective veto. -- America's concession to Russia was that Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's demands for an absolute protective veto.<sup>17</sup> Roosevelt did not regard this as a concession to Russia for he thought, as stated before, that

<sup>13</sup>Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 395.

<sup>14</sup>Stettinius, p. 171.

<sup>15</sup>Sherwood, p. 855.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, pp. 966-968.

<sup>16</sup>Sumner Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East-Part II", Harper's Magazine, 202 (March, 1951), p. 77.

<sup>17</sup>Sherwood, p. 855.; Leopold, p. 624.



the American Senate would demand some sort of insurance against United States involvement in all sorts of wars in all parts of the world, and as insurance that American sovereignty would be protected before the Senate would ratify the Charter.

#### Reasons for Russian Demands for Membership of the Soviet Republics

Soviet Union demands that its member republics be given seats in the proposed world organization was indirectly related to the problem of the veto and the principle of unanimity in that it showed at an early date that Russia was primarily interested in its own national security. Although the Ukraine and Byelorussia were to be technically considered independent,<sup>18</sup> these two nations would follow Soviet policy in every respect. This would, in effect, give the Soviet Union greater bargaining power in the Security Council, if either of these two nations were elected to that body, and in the General Assembly. By having these two nations admitted to the United Nations and possibly to the Security Council, Stalin would reach his most important objective.<sup>19</sup>

This plan for formation of a Soviet bloc of states in the United Nations fitted in with the whole pattern of Soviet policy as analyzed by Averill Harriman in the fall of 1944.<sup>20</sup> Stalin was more interested in Soviet security through the creation of a Soviet

<sup>18</sup>Jados, Documents, p. 157.

<sup>19</sup>Stettinius, p. 187.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, pp. 197-198.

<sup>20</sup>Stettinius, p. 310.



bloc and through the creation of a ring by Soviet domination in the border countries than through the security offered by Soviet participation in the Grand Alliance in the United Nations.<sup>21</sup>

#### American Reaction to Soviet Demands

When Stalin presented his arguments in regard to the admission of two or three more Soviet republics, Roosevelt began to acquiesce for he felt that actual power would rest in the hands of the Grand Alliance in the Security Council. In that body, each country would have only one vote, and any one of the major powers could block the decision, in matters of enforcement, of a group of nations arrayed against it. Roosevelt felt, therefore, that two or three more Russian votes out of fifty in the General Assembly wouldn't make too much difference.<sup>22</sup> He was not, however, willing to see the security of the United States endangered by a bloc of Soviet votes in the Assembly.

#### The San Francisco Conference

Pre-Conference agreement among big powers. -- The major problems of each nation concerning the creation of a world organization were known long before the beginning of the San Francisco Conference.<sup>23</sup> The various conferences of the foreign ministers and the heads of states of the big powers had done much either to solve or compromise these problems. By the time the conference began the decisions and

<sup>21</sup>Welles, Harper's (March, 1951), p. 78.

<sup>22</sup>Stettinius, p. 188.; Jados, p. 170.

<sup>23</sup>Stettinius, pp. 283-285.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, pp. 712-719.



compromises as to which was to have the higher order, world organization or national sovereignty, had been reached by the big powers.<sup>24</sup>

The safeguarding of the national sovereignty and the national security for each of the big powers had been the fundamental objectives. These objectives had been reached by the recognition among the big powers that they were the only ones capable of keeping the peace, and that the small power ultimately must bend to the will of the big powers. Recognizing these facts, the big powers realized that, of necessity, they must be unified in their actions, but actions taken against their own interests must not be permitted.

Conference voting procedures. -- In the first days of the conference it was decided that each delegate was to have one vote in each body of the conference in which it was represented,<sup>25</sup> and it was decided that a majority vote would suffice on methods of procedure, and a two-thirds majority would be necessary on other questions.<sup>26</sup>

Small power inequality. -- The Charter of the United Nations has as its first principle that "The Organization is based on the sovereign equality of all members."<sup>27</sup> Despite this manifestation of equality the United Nations is not primarily an organization in which principles of equality appear to occupy a paramount or even a

<sup>24</sup>Dennet and Turner, VIII, pp. 361-363.

<sup>25</sup>Wellington Koo, Jr., Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 8.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Department of State, Selected Documents on the United Nations Conference on International Organization (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 75.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 207.



principal place. The Security Council, with its methods of voting, denies at the outset the equality of the member states.

Although some of the delegations from the small nations with the memory of Munich fresh in their minds were opposed to giving the Security Council any power to impose a particular settlement, most of the smaller nations were anxious to have the Security Council assume direct responsibility for keeping the peace and, therefore, did not question the applicability of the veto power.<sup>28</sup> The smaller states at no time desired to possess the veto power themselves. They merely did not wish the larger states to be able to halt the machinery of the organization whenever it seemed to the small members that a decision in the Security Council might injure the interests of the Big Powers.<sup>29</sup>

Attempts by small powers to limit the veto. -- Many methods and suggestions were put forth in the form of amendments by the small powers. Some of the amendments favored the enlargement of the number of non-permanent members in the Security Council, taking away some of its powers, of limiting its powers, or making it responsible in some manner to the General Assembly.<sup>30</sup> The Soviet representative's reply was that actions of the Security Council should be fast and effective. The suddenness of enemy action during the last war, he said, ought to prove this point.<sup>31</sup> This was also the attitude of the United States.

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<sup>28</sup>Koo, p. 124.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 139.

<sup>30</sup>Selected Documents of UNCIO, pp. 267-400.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 253.



Amendments to limit veto power. -- The Australian delegate, speaking for all the small nations, introduced several amendments which would have limited the veto power of the Big Five.<sup>32</sup> However, the amendment failed passage by a vote of ten pros, twenty cons, and fifteen abstentions.<sup>33</sup> These abstentions were all cast by small powers who feared to vote for the amendments because the big powers made it quite clear that they would accept no further changes in the Yalta formula.<sup>34</sup> It was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all.<sup>35</sup>

Concessions to the small powers. -- In deference to the smaller nations the Charter did provide that, in the election of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council, "due regard" is to be "especially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the organization".<sup>36</sup> "Due regard" was to be paid to "equitable geographical distribution".<sup>37</sup> It was also decided that the Security Council should make annual reports to the General Assembly as a concession to the small powers.

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid, p. 151; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, pp. 1340-1343.

<sup>33</sup>Koo, pp. 153-154.

<sup>34</sup>Selected Documents of the UNCIO, p. 433.

<sup>35</sup>F. O. Wilcox, "Yalta Voting Formula in the Security Council," American Political Science Review, 39 (October, 1945), p. 954.

<sup>36</sup>Vera M. Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace (New York: Whittlesey House, 1946), p. 67.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, pp. 1126, 1199.



With these concessions given to the smaller powers, voting on the Yalta formula was in favor of the Big Five.<sup>38</sup>

Checks on the big powers. -- Although the Big Powers retained control in the Security Council, there were checks on that power. The Big Five did not constitute a majority. The five powers must secure the votes of two other powers for action. The five non-permanent members can, by acting jointly, veto any decision of the big powers. And a most important check, no state or group of states can prevent any nation from bringing a dispute before the Security Council to obtain a hearing.<sup>39</sup>

But each of the great powers regarded the absolute protective veto as a safeguard for itself against any enforcement measures put forward to its disadvantage by any power or group of powers. The absolute protective veto was a precaution against any proposal that the small powers might make which would commit the big powers to action including troops without their consent.<sup>40</sup>

#### Signature and Ratification

On the twenty-sixth day of June, 1945, the aspirations of mankind were fulfilled with the signing of the United Nations Charter establishing a world organization to promote international peace and security. It remained for the member nations to approve and ratify the Charter.

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<sup>38</sup>Dennet and Turner, VII, p. 447.

<sup>39</sup>Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto", International Organization (June, 1948), p. 229.

<sup>40</sup>Wilcox, p. 952.



There was little doubt that the Charter would be ratified. The arguments presented to the Senate by members of the United States delegation precluded the idea that the United States would be involved in situations and wars about which she would have no say. John Foster Dulles made this point quite clear in a statement before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate:

Actually the document before you charts a path which we can pursue joyfully and without fear. Under it we remain masters of our own destiny. The Charter does not subordinate us to any super government. There is no right on the part of the United Nations Organization to intervene in our domestic affairs without our consent. If the joint adventure fails, we can withdraw.<sup>41</sup>

With such arguments being presented, it was not unusual that the Senate ratified the Charter by a vote of 89 to 2. As a result of this action the United States became the first nation in the world to ratify the Charter.<sup>42</sup> Ratification by Russia followed soon after.

#### Conclusions in Regard to the Charter and the Unanimity Principle

An attempt at security. -- The United States and the Soviet Union, in the search for security, had made a long twenty-year march from isolationism to international cooperation.

In this march, both of these nations realized, as did the other signatory nations, that there were no idealistic, unrealistic objectives contained within the Charter. They all realized that the primary task of the United Nations was to answer the question of how to seek security both in the national and international field.

<sup>41</sup>Bartlett, p. 673.

<sup>42</sup>Leopold, p. 632; Dean, p. 101.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, p. 1281.



The problem of power factors. -- In the days following San Francisco, the dissenting votes of the major powers, primarily those of the U.S.S.R., have prevented action in the Security Council. It was hoped that this would not happen, but the facts belie the principle.

It is not the fact that the voting problem itself is so important, because the vote itself does not provide the real enforcement. It is the fact that the vote would show whether real unanimity could be achieved. With or without the vote, unless the big powers could agree on matters affecting their vital interests, there would be no peace and security. It is not, therefore, the veto itself, but the power factors involved in the use of the veto which has hampered the effectiveness of the United Nations.

The great powers and unanimity. -- It would appear that the great powers had finally reached agreement on the type of world organization to be erected, an organization in which the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security depended upon the united action of the great powers who had been members of the Grand Alliance during World War II. It remained to be seen how this principle of unanimity would break down in the days following San Francisco, because of irreconcilable differences between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Weakness of the unanimity principle. -- The small nations realized the preponderance of power lay with the big nations. The Security Council could never take action without this power at its disposal, and the Council could never come to any decision if an act of aggression were committed by one of the big powers. The Security



Council would be unlikely to take any action against a small nation enjoying the aid and assistance of one of the big powers. All realized that the General Assembly was a sounding board of no real authority. And they all realized that it would be next to impossible to change the Charter in any way, shape or form without the consent of the big powers.

But all of these nations felt that no organization could be made overnight. They felt that international organization rather than international anarchy contained the best hopes for peace and security, even if it meant the delegation of some of their national authority to that body. If it were possible in the future that the great powers really could establish a measure of security to the small nations, the small nations would find that they had exchanged the fear of war for the arts of peace, that they had exchanged a mere shadow of national sovereignty for the substance of security against aggression.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Dean, p. 13.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE GREEK CASE

#### Introduction

As has been suggested, it was not the failure of the voting formula itself that caused the breakdown of the unanimity principle which had been built up so carefully and arduously by the big powers during the war years. It was the problem of the power factors involved that caused the breakdown in the years which followed the defeat of Germany and Japan.

It was hoped that in the Security Council of the United Nations the resolution of the power conflict between the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, might come about. A careful study, however, of one case which the Security Council undertook to solve will show that Soviet Russia and American could not meet with the principle of unanimity. This Greek Case, in fact, will show that there were irreconcilable differences between Soviet concepts of security and American concepts of security which could not be resolved by any means at the disposal of the Security Council.

#### Historical Background of the Greek Case

Russian desire for influence in the Balkans. -- Historically, the Russia of the Czars was always interested in obtaining hegemony in the Balkan area to carry out two objectives. The first objective of Czarist Russia was to build a balance of power within the Balkan



states to protect herself from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The second objective was to gain an outlet from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union in the years before World War II tried to monopolize the Balkans to build a balance of power against a resurgent Germany. The Soviet Union, also, was interested in gaining control of the valuable oil fields in Rumania and the Near East,<sup>1</sup> in cutting off the supply lines of the Western countries to these areas, and extending the influence of the Soviet Union as far as possible.

To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets attempted to block Western moves in the Balkan area. During World War II Soviet leaders objected strenuously to the opening on the part of the West of a second front in the Balkans.<sup>2</sup> To maintain the sphere of influence which U.S.S.R. had so carefully built up in the early days of World War II and to keep British influence in the Balkans from expanding, an agreement was signed between Foreign Minister Molotov and Foreign Secretary Eden in 1944 which divided the Balkans into two spheres. This agreement stated that the British were to have only the control of Greece and the southern half of Yugoslavia.<sup>3</sup> After the end of World War II, the Soviet leaders realized that this agreement did not fit in with their objectives. The Russian leaders decided, therefore, that the Molotov-Eden Agreement should be disregarded. Seizing upon the excuse that the British were maintaining the

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<sup>1</sup>Krout, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 240.

<sup>3</sup>Stettinius, p. 11.



Greek monarchy over the strenuous objection of the Greek people, the Soviets began to participate indirectly in the Greek problem by causing partisans from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to enter Greece and foment civil war.<sup>4</sup> The U.S.S.R. in 1946 also brought to the attention of the Security Council the question of British intervention in Greece.<sup>5</sup> By an analysis of these objectives and actions, it can be seen that the Soviet Union was vitally interested in breaking up the balance of power directed against her which had been created in the Near East by the Western powers.

British desires for control of Greece. -- British interests in the Balkans were directly opposed to Soviet interests. Historically, Great Britain, prior to World War II, was interested in building a balance of power in the Balkans to be directed not only against Germany and her allies, but also against Soviet Russia. Great Britain also was interested in keeping her supply lines to the Near East open and, consequently, wanted to keep the Soviet fleet out of the Mediterranean. It was for these purposes that the Molotov-Eden Agreement of 1944 was agreed to by Churchill.<sup>6</sup> It was also for the purpose of keeping the Soviet Union from extending her control into Western Europe that Churchill had argued so vehemently for a Balkan campaign instituted by the West. Great Britain was vitally interested

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<sup>4</sup>Treadgold, p. 415.; Jados, p. 181.; Frank Smothers, William H. McNeill, Report on Greece, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), p. 152.

<sup>5</sup>Goodrich and Hambro, p. 59; Edward O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 211.

<sup>6</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 240.



in maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans which Britain so assiduously helped to build.

Post-World War II difficulties. -- In the early days following the end of World War II the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union realized that the power situation was now completely different from what it had been. The British had lost their supremacy in naval power and were searching about for some other means of protecting their supply lines.

The United States had come to realize, with the loss of British sea power and protection for the Western hemisphere that the United States supply lines both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas were now threatened by Soviet expansionist tendencies and that America's vital interests no longer lay just in the Western hemisphere, but had now become global in scope, and the Soviets were anxious to exploit every Western weakness in order to promote Soviet interests.

These unsettled conditions in the world were focused in Greece in 1946 and 1947. The British were forced to admit they no longer had the power capabilities to maintain their troops and navy in Greece and asked the United States to replace them.<sup>7</sup> This the United States did in order to protect American supply lines in the Mediterranean and Near East. This was also done to prevent the Soviets from filling the power vacuum left by the British in Greece. It was Administration thought, however, that both Greece and Turkey should contribute something in order to keep the Soviets out of not only the Mediterranean, but out of their countries as well. The United States put forward the

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<sup>7</sup>Jados, p. 192.



Truman Doctrine to seek these ends.<sup>8</sup> The Soviets exploited British and American weaknesses by indirectly fomenting civil war.

Action in the Security Council. -- The Greek Question was first presented to the Security Council by the Soviet Union in a letter dated January 21, 1946, invoking Article 35 of the Charter and charging that the presence of British troops in Greece was causing international tensions which were detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security. The matter, however, was declared closed by the Council after a full discussion had taken place and after it was declared that the Security Council had taken note of the views expressed.<sup>9</sup>

On August 24, 1946, the question again came before the Council under Article 1, Paragraph 2 and Article 35, Paragraph 1 of the Charter because of charges of the Ukraine government that British troops in Greece were the primary cause of border violations and persecutions of minority groups.<sup>10</sup> Several resolutions were brought forward, by the U.S.S.R.,<sup>11</sup> by Belgium,<sup>12</sup> by Poland and others for pacific settlement of the dispute.<sup>13</sup> They all failed passage and the discussion was again declared closed.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Krout, p. 243; Ballance, pp. 141, 214.

<sup>9</sup>Goodrich and Hambro, p. 59.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>11</sup>Security Council Official Records (Lake Success: United Nations, 1946--), First Year, Second Series, No. 13, pp. 334-335.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., No. 16, p. 404.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 415-417.

<sup>14</sup>Goodrich and Hambro, p. 60.



Another solution under pacific settlement of disputes was sought when the Greeks on December 3, 1946, charged that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were giving support to the Greek guerillas. On December 19, 1946, an amended resolution of the United States to establish a commission of investigation was approved with the Soviet Union abstaining.<sup>15</sup> The Security Council began its consideration on June 27, 1947, of the report of the commission, the majority of which members said Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were aiding the Greek guerillas.

The majority of the commission stated also that the Security Council should recommend to the four states concerned that they take such actions as deemed necessary to settle the dispute among themselves in a peaceful manner.<sup>16</sup> A United States resolution incorporating these recommendations was rejected because of a Russian veto.<sup>17</sup> A Soviet resolution in turn which put the blame on Greece and which called for the end of foreign intervention in Greece was rejected.<sup>18</sup> The Greeks then invoked Article 39 of the Charter, and the Australian delegation offered a resolution which placed the question under enforcement measures of the Charter. This resolution and a subsequent resolution of the United States to the same effect was rejected by a Soviet veto.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 28, pp. 666-691.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., No. 51, pp. 1119-1123.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., No. 66, pp. 1602-1612.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., No. 69, pp. 1726-1730; Ballance, p. 191.

<sup>19</sup>Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 79, pp. 2093-2099.



Attempts on the part of the United States to let the General Assembly examine the question under the authority of Article 12 of the Charter met with a Soviet use of the "double" veto. The whole question was finally taken off the agenda of the Security Council and given to the General Assembly by means of a procedural vote.<sup>20</sup>

#### Russian Methods of Seeking Objectives

No direct participation. -- By an examination of the official records of the Security Council discussion of the Greek question, it can be deduced what were the Soviet methods of achieving its objectives. Although it was almost certain that the Soviet Union was the instigator of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian aid to the Greek guerilla forces, the Soviet Union wisely kept from giving direct aid to those guerilla forces so that the Soviet representatives in the Security Council would be able to cast their votes under "pacific settlement of disputes". By not giving direct aid to the three Balkan countries but by upholding their viewpoints in the Security Council, the Soviet Union was able to indulge in a "war by proxy" to further her national objectives. The Soviet bloc also refused to participate in a sub-committee to be established under the authority of the Security Council. For this sub-committee, to the Soviet mind, would have kept the Soviet bloc in the minority and would have allowed the Anglo-American bloc to retain a foothold in Greece.<sup>21</sup> In addition it would

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<sup>20</sup>Goodrich and Hambro, p. 61; Ballance, p. 155.

<sup>21</sup>Security Council Official Records, Second Year, No. 58, p. 1334.



have allowed the Anglo-American bloc to interfere in the affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and thus expand the influence of the Western bloc in the Balkans.<sup>22</sup>

Backing of the Soviet Satellite countries in the United Nations. -- The Soviet government backed completely the position taken by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia for it was through these countries that the Soviets sought their objectives. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet representative, in a speech on September 26, 1946, said that the setting up of a commission of investigations as sought by the United States delegation would throw the guilt on Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, thereby absolving the foreign interventionists in Greece.<sup>23</sup>

In another speech Gromyko said that the Western powers' attempt to throw the blame on Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia was an attempt to divert the attention of the Security Council to those questions which were non-existent. He continued by saying that the United States was seeking any method available in order to gain control of the rivers, oil fields, and fertile lands of the three Balkan countries under United States attack.<sup>24</sup> The Russian delegate, in another series of discussions on the same problem, said that the British did not want a full investigation in the Council, with Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian representatives participating, because such an investigation would prove that the British were covering up their activities in Greece. The investigation would prove that the British were misusing the Security Council for their own interests and would

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., No. 59, pp. 1346-1356.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 16, pp. 396-398.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 382.



also prove that the Albanians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs were correct in their charges that Greece, aided and abetted by the British and Americans, was the nation which had caused the trouble in the Balkans.<sup>25</sup>

The Soviet resolution of September 16, contained all the accusations and demands which the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav representatives had put before the Council.<sup>26</sup> This resolution said that monarchist elements in Greece were the cause of all the trouble for it was only these elements, in control of the Greek government, which were seeking to annex certain territories of her neighbors, which were persecuting certain minority ethnic groups, and which were seeking to bring about armed conflict between Greece and Albania. This Russian resolution, as did the statements of the three northern neighbors of Greece, called upon Greece to put an end to border activities and to terminate the persecution of national minorities. The resolution also called upon the Security Council to keep the whole question on its agenda if the Greek government did not comply with the above recommendations.

Use of the Security Council as a propaganda device. --

Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the editor of the New York Times, said, in regard to the question of the pacific settlement of the Greek question in the summer of 1946, that the whole plan of organization on the part of the Soviet bloc was to produce sufficient chaos in Greece, so that British and world public opinion would demand the withdrawal of British troops.

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., No. 6, pp. 151-156.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., No. 13, pp. 334-335.



This would produce a temporary postponement of the elections in Greece in order to strengthen the Leftist forces.<sup>27</sup> To put this statement in broader terms, the Russians were using the Security Council as a propaganda device for two effects: (1) use the sovereignty principle to gain the support of the small nations, (2) to bring about a "fait accompli" by delaying tactics. Statements made in the Security Council point up this fact that the Russians were using the Security Council as a propaganda device. The British delegate, Cadogan, on September 5, 1946, referred to the Ukrainian charges and called them nothing but propaganda tactics to gain the support of the smaller countries which might be taken in by such propaganda. He went on to say:

So here you have it! His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is responsible not only for all that may have gone wrong in Greece, it is responsible for the oppression of minorities, it is inciting Greece to attack her much more powerful neighbors, it has just faked a plebiscite. It has violated the Charter of the United Nations. This is Mr. Manuilsky's original charge.<sup>28</sup>

In order to prove, however, to the small nations that Britain and America were imperialist nations, Gromyko continually repeated the charge that foreign interventionists in Greece were causing the Greek people to live under an unpopular regime, and that these foreign interventionists were causing the Greek government to undertake actions which violated the sovereignty of her neighbors.<sup>29</sup> This argument

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., No. 9, p. 230, quoting Arthur Hays Sulzberger, New York Times, July 26, 1946.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., No. 9, p. 243.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., No. 28, pp. 639-647.



was also used by the Yugoslav representative,<sup>30</sup> the Albanian representative,<sup>31</sup> and the Bulgarian representatives.<sup>32</sup> Even as far along as August, 1947, Gromyko claimed that foreign troops and foreign aid for Greece was nothing but a form of enslavement, and the fact that this aid was requested by the Greek leaders was only proof that the Greek leaders were willing

"to sacrifice Greek independence and national sovereignty in order to maintain in Greece a regime which is not popular and which is not supported by the Greek people."<sup>33</sup>

Although the Soviet Union had maintained from the beginning that it did not desire to have the smaller nations have any voice in the world organization, the sovereign equality principle was used by the Soviet bloc in another manner to gain the support of the small nations. When the Soviet and Polish delegates asked that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia be permitted to join the commission which was to be established by the Council in December of 1946,<sup>34</sup> these delegates were, in effect, promising the small nations that, in any such future commissions to be established, the Soviet bloc would see to it that the small nations would be able to protect their interests to a certain degree.

When the Commission reported to the Security Council in June of 1947, however, the Soviet bloc no longer maintained this

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 661-662.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., No. 51, pp. 1129-1143.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., No. 28, pp. 661-662.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 69, pp. 1719-1720.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 28, pp. 652-653.



position. They now maintained that any such investigatory commission violated national sovereignty. One argument used in this Greek question was that a majority vote in any such commission would not guarantee just conclusions because the underlying purpose of any such commission, as proved in the Commission of Investigation in the Greek question, would be to keep up foreign interference or intervention by the Western powers in any such country investigated. These Western powers, the Soviets claimed, would know in advance that there would be no objectivity in any such commission, because the Soviet bloc which was seeking to protect the sovereignty of all nations would always be in the minority.<sup>35</sup>

Both Russia and her partner, Poland, claimed that any such commission as proposed by the Americans for the pacific settlement of disputes in the Greek case which allowed that commission to decide which acts were threats to the peace would throw the blame equally on Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and would, in effect, place all four of the Balkan countries under a United Nations trusteeship dominated by the Anglo-American bloc. No self-respecting sovereign nation could allow such blame to be placed on its shoulders no could it allow the establishment of such a trusteeship.<sup>36</sup> The Soviet delegate further maintained that, because Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia did not belong to the International Refugee Organization, any attempt to have that body take charge of refugees in those three countries would be in

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 76, pp. 1975-1977.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., No. 59, pp. 1354-1356.



violation of national sovereignty. Such an arrangement in any small country, the Soviet delegate maintained, would be just another form of trusteeship under domination of the Anglo-American bloc.<sup>37</sup>

With arguments such as these being presented by the Soviet bloc delegates, it can be seen that the Soviet concept of the sovereignty principle was that this principle should be used to protect not only the Soviet Union but also the Soviet Union satellites from penetration by Western ideas and Western force.

The Soviet delegate also stated that, although the Security Council did have the right to inquire into facts connected with a certain dispute or situation and to conduct an investigation in regard to that dispute, all decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter dealing with pacific settlement including the right of conducting an investigation was only recommendatory. No country, as a result, had the legal obligation to allow an investigation to be conducted on its own territory,<sup>38</sup> as such an investigation would be contrary to the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter.

The Soviets even used this principle of the sovereign right of nations when confronted with the fact that they had not participated in the four-power commission to supervise the Greek elections. By not participating they could claim that the small percentage of votes cast for Leftist candidates would prove that the Anglo-American bloc had "faked" the elections.<sup>39</sup> Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate,

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., No. 76, pp. 1970-1977.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., No. 64, pp. 1541-1542.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 9, pp. 216-222.



said that the reason for Soviet non-participation in the commission was because the U.S.S.R.

"regarded the establishment of such tutelage over Greece . . . as an intervention in the affairs of Greece."<sup>40</sup>

With all these arguments in favor of national sovereignty, with all the long speeches directed against American and British imperialism, and by the use of the veto, the Russians hoped to bring about a "fait accompli" which would see them in a position of dominance in Greece. Gromyko pointed this out in a speech to the Security Council on July 15, 1947, although he made the point in a rather back-handed way. He said he did not believe the discussion on the Greek question should be speeded up, even although the Greek representative was claiming new disturbances along Greece's northern border. The claiming of these new disturbances was only for the purpose of having the resolutions of the Anglo-American bloc put into force as soon as possible by the Security Council.<sup>41</sup>

Use of the veto. -- Speaking on the veto in connection with the Greek case, Gromyko said:

The U.S.S.R. does not consider itself bound to agree on proposals on the Greek or any other question which, in the opinion of the government of U.S.S.R., are not in conformity with the interests of the maintenance of peace and the development of friendly relations between States, more especially if their acceptance might only lead to still greater complications.<sup>42</sup>

The Russians were not eager to have commissions of investigation in the Balkans for the purpose of solving the Greek question.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., No. 11, p. 291.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 58, pp. 1337-1338.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., No. 76, p. 1975.



The Soviets did not want to see the Security Council impose any enforcement measures detrimental to their interests in the Balkans. This is why the Soviet Union used the "absolute protective" veto in connection with the United States and Australian resolutions which would have imposed such measures. If one remembers that the Soviet Union's concept of a world organization did not include the smaller nations' having a voice in the organization, it is not hard to see why the Soviet Union in the Security Council made use of the "double" veto in connection with the United States proposal to turn the Greek question over to the General Assembly under authority of Article 12 of the Charter.

Bilateral agreements -- The Soviet Union, always fearful that the United Nations would take action contrary to Soviet policy in respect to Greece and the Balkans, propounded that the only way to solve the whole question would be through bilateral agreements worked out independently by Greece and each of her northern neighbors. Such a solution would settle these differences on a one to one basis.<sup>43</sup>

Such a solution, however, would successfully drive out British and American influences in Greece. Such a solution would also enable the three northern countries of Greece to exert direct pressure on that country and would enable Russia, through her control of the three satellite countries, to exert indirect pressure on Greece. By such direct and indirect pressures, the Soviet Union hoped to force Greece under Soviet control. The Polish resolution of August 6, 1947, which

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 1968-1974.



would have caused the Greek government to make such bilateral agreements was, however, voted down.<sup>44</sup>

#### American Methods of Seeking Objectives

Direct participation. -- Directly opposed to the Soviet method of non-participation in the affairs of Greece were the American and British methods of maintaining their influence and retaining the balance of power. United States officials never denied the fact that money, arms, and military missions were being sent to Greece to prevent the Leftist guerillas from seizing control of the Greek government. The purpose behind the Truman Doctrine as stated to the American Congress was that the United States could not

"allow changes in the status quo . . . by such methods as coercion, or by any such subterfuges as political infiltration."<sup>45</sup>

The British, too, never denied that they had their troops in Greece for the purpose of protecting British interests, but they did deny that the maintenance of such troops was in violation of the United Nations Charter. Cadogan, in a speech to the Security Council on September 25, 1946, pointed this out when he said:

"It (The Charter) does not say that no Member of the United Nations may maintain troops in the territory of another Member at the request of the latter."

He continued by saying that the Charter only forbade the United Nations as an independent body from interfering in the domestic affairs of a member state.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., No. 71, p. 1800.

<sup>45</sup>U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 4, 1947), Supplement.

<sup>46</sup>Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 9, p. 247.



The fact that the United States and Great Britain were vitally interested in a four-power commission to watch over the Greek elections of 1946, also shows that these two countries were guarding their own interests and were not willing to see the Greek forces of the Left win the elections by political machination.

The Soviets were correct in their viewpoint that the British and Americans were seeking to continue their influence in Greek affairs through United Nations commissions. The British and Americans knew quite well that their views would prevail on any one of these commissions. For all the talk of having a committee of three or five selected on the basis of impartiality<sup>47</sup> or a commission composed of all the members of the Security Council, and not just a commission of a group of nations,<sup>48</sup> the Americans and the British knew, by the very organization of the United Nations, that their viewpoints would be the prevailing viewpoint.<sup>49</sup>

Gain support of small nations. -- In reply to a charge by Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate, that a wall of votes was being organized against U.S.S.R., Van Kleffens, the Netherlands representative, said:

I hold the view that nobody has the right, if a vote threatens to go against him, to attribute sinister motives to people who have no sinister motives at all. . .<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., No. 16, pp.394-396.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 58, pp. 1328-1329.

<sup>49</sup>Norman J. Padelford, ed. Current Readings on International Relations (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1947--), No. 3 (January, 1948), p. 133, quoting Thomas J. Hamilton, "The United Nations at World, Yale Review, Autumn, 1947.

<sup>50</sup>Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 13, p. 325.



It was the method of the United States to have such small countries as the Netherlands agree that their interests were the same as those of the United States, that the United States was protecting those interests, and that the United States had no sinister motives in that protection. When the Council was called upon to decide whether to allow the Albanian and Bulgarian representatives to argue their case before the Council, the United States delegate said

. . . the Security Council should abide by the spirit of the Charter and grant the opportunity to be heard to the States concerned.<sup>51</sup>

In the discussion on the report of the Commission of Investigation, the United States delegate said that the Security Council had no rights to decide, as was desired by the Soviet bloc, to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece except insofar as those affairs might be contributing to the situation along Greece's northern boundary.<sup>52</sup>

The United States stand that the investigation committee had made the correct recommendations was upheld by the Brazilian delegate for he felt that even if the commission had used the wrong procedure, in bringing out the facts, the wrong procedures could in no way affect the conviction that a serious situation existed in northern Greece.<sup>53</sup>

The United States delegate also maintained throughout the discussions that such situations which could be deemed dangerous should be taken care of immediately.<sup>54</sup> If the power problem could not

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., No. 10, pp. 266-267.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 54, pp. 1204-1209.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 1211.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., No. 15, p. 387.



be resolved among the big powers in the Security Council, then the small nations of the General Assembly should be given the opportunity of making recommendations.

Not only did the United States wish to show the small nations that the United States was interested in a fair hearing for all and was interested in protecting the sovereignty of other countries, but the United States, also, wanted to show the small nations that indirect Soviet domination of Greece meant a loss of sovereignty for that country.

For this reason, Warren Austin, the United States delegate, claimed that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, acting under Soviet guidance, had no intention of settling their dispute by peaceful means nor did they wish to develop friendly relations with that country nor were they interested in the sovereign equality of Greece. Yugoslavia had violated Article 1 of the Charter, and Albania and Bulgaria had violated Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the Charter.<sup>55</sup> For these reasons, the United States delegate on August 4, 1947, voted against the Soviet resolution which would have branded Greece the aggressor nation and would have established a commission to see to it that the people of Greece, and not the Greek government, were the recipients of foreign aid.<sup>56</sup>

Use of the United Nations to gain moral backing for policies. -- Coupled with the method of gaining support of the smaller nations by pointing out that the United States was interested in a fair

<sup>55</sup>Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 51, pp. 1120-1121.

<sup>56</sup>Security Council Official Records, Second Year, No. 69, pp. 1726-1730.



hearing for all countries, and interested in the protection of the sovereign rights of all nations, and that Soviet attempts to indirectly control Greece meant a loss of sovereignty for that country, was the method of using the United Nations to gain moral backing for United States policies.

To gain the support of the majority of the small nations and to gain the moral backing that such a majority carried with it, the United States was required to do three things. First of all, the United States was required to word proposals so that the small nations could adhere to them. In the defense of his government's proposal of December 18, 1946, Herschel Johnson, the United States delegate, declared:

It seems to me to be the inescapable and self-evident duty of the Security Council to investigate the facts pertaining to these border violations without attempting at this time, on the basis of present information, to prejudge the issues. For this reason my Government has instructed me to propose the setting up of a commission of investigation to ascertain the facts . . .<sup>57</sup>

The resolution itself was worded so as to appear that the United Nations and the Security Council were gaining full control of the situation. The commission was able to investigate in all areas concerned, and yet the sovereignty of nations would be protected by having the Secretary-General of the United Nations make all arrangements of entry into certain countries.<sup>58</sup> The wording of the United States proposal of June 27, 1947,<sup>59</sup> as amended by various small

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 27, pp. 629-631.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., No. 51, pp. 1124-1126.



powers, contained the substance of the recommendations as proposed by the majority of the investigating committee. This resolution, because of that wording, was subscribed to by nine out of eleven members of the Council on July 29, 1947. The Soviet Union blocked its passage by use of a veto.<sup>60</sup> Even the resolution of September 15, 1947, was worded to show the small nations and the people of the world that the United States was interested in having a solution worked out by the United Nations in the General Assembly if necessary.<sup>61</sup>

If the United States method was to gain the support of the smaller nations and gain the moral backing of the United Nations in support of United States policies, it follows that such a method would necessarily call for Soviet vetoes on American proposals.

As was stated by the Ukrainian delegate at the outset of the discussion, a wall of votes was being organized against the U.S.S.R. by the Anglo-American bloc. The Polish delegate also referred to this problem on August 19, 1947:

We must decide whether we really want to reach such a solution, or whether the aim of the Council is merely to cause more vetoes from one side to another.

I understand that for some reasons a veto may be very useful for certain Member States. However, purposely to cause a veto to be used by submitting new resolutions which we know beforehand serves neither the authority nor the dignity of the Council, nor indeed the cause of peace.<sup>62</sup>

Forcing the Soviets to use the veto even in the face of a majority vote was just another method of the United States to prove

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., No. 66, pp. 1602-1612.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., No. 89, p. 2369.

<sup>62</sup>Security Council Official Records, Second Year Series, No. 58, p. 132.



to the smaller nations that Soviet interests were not those of the smaller nations.

#### Small powers as Conciliators

Although the small powers found that they could agree more readily with the United States proposals than with the proposals of the Soviet bloc, these smaller powers were not willing to support the United States proposals in order to condemn the Soviet bloc. The small nations' position was stated very clearly by the Columbian representative in the Security Council:

We cannot help saying that it has given us great concern to see that they (the United States and U.S.S.R.) are conflicting to a degree that seems to rule out any attempt by the representatives of the small nations to approach the Greek question.<sup>63</sup>

The Australian delegate said he did not want to see the Security Council become a place where opposition between the Great Powers is accentuated.<sup>64</sup> The Columbian representative speaking in behalf of the small nations believed that the Security Council should not seek to impose a settlement which would increase the tension between the East and West. The Council should act as a conciliator and suggest ways and means of working out their difficulties by themselves. To this end a commission of good offices and conciliation with headquarters in a neutral country would be established for the disputants to work out their differences.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., No. 58, p. 1321.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 13, pp. 329-333.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., Second Year, No. 58, pp. 1322-1323.



In further discussion, the smaller nations came to the conclusion that diplomatic relations between all four countries should be established, before any attempts at good-neighborliness could be made.<sup>66</sup> The Greek question was not resolved in the Security Council nor the United Nations, even with the small powers' action as conciliators, because of the East-West power factors involved.

The problem was, therefore, turned over to the General Assembly. It is not within the scope of this paper to study the resolution of the Greek question within the General Assembly, but note should be taken of the fact that the Assembly did, through its broad powers of recommendation and investigation, call upon the parties directly concerned to settle their dispute peacefully and make recommendations looking to the establishment of normal relations between these parties. The General Assembly also established a Special Committee to aid in carrying out the above recommendations. The Soviet bloc announced its non-cooperation with this committee and by its action seriously hampered the effectiveness of the committee. It was not until Yugoslavia broke away from the Cominform that a measure of peace was restored to Greece.

#### General Conclusions

General Soviet objectives. -- This study of the Greek question will show the global objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviets, by their proposals, vetoes, and propaganda in the Security Council, showed that they were interested only in using

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., No. 63, pp. 1479-1489.



the United Nations to further their national objectives. By the use of such methods, they sought to expand the influence of the Soviet Union and Communism not only in Greece and the Balkan area, but throughout the world.

By using the principle of sovereign equality the Soviets were attempting to wean the smaller nations away from the Anglo-American sphere of influence and have these nations enter the Soviet sphere. By the use of the sovereignty principle, the Soviets sought to prevent other nations and organs of the United Nations from entering the Anglo-American sphere of influence as well. By recommending bi-lateral agreements as a solution for disputes, the Soviets further sought to drive out American and British influence in the smaller countries while bringing these smaller countries into the Soviet sphere. With the use of bi-lateral agreements and by the support of nations such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets were seeking to create a balance of power or a security belt for themselves outside the United Nations framework.

General American objectives. -- With the Greek question again as a frame of reference, America's global objectives can be seen. By attempting to show that the smaller nations' interests were the same as those of the United States, by attempting to show the smaller nations that Soviet domination meant a loss of sovereignty, by attempting to gain moral backing for United States policies, and by participating directly in the United Nations, the United States was seeking to retain the balance of power once directed against Hitler and now directed against the U.S.S.R. By the use of such methods, America was also seeking to protect herself and the Western hemisphere from attack.



The methods outlined above would, United States leaders felt, bring about this protection.

Inability of the United Nations to act as an independent agent. -- The Greek case, however, shows most clearly that the United Nations cannot act as an independent agent to settle disputes if two great powers are in fundamental disagreement. The United Nations can only act if those nations are willing to delegate supreme authority to the United Nations. Because each nation is continually seeking more power in the maintenance of its vital interests, nations are not willing to delegate supreme authority to an international body. Because of this dilemma and because the United Nations had been launched in an already polarized world,<sup>67</sup> the United Nations has been unable to take independent action in important cases.

Furthermore, basic differences in philosophy and disagreements on objectives in the field of collective security between the U.S.S.R. and the United States render action on the part of the United Nations impossible when these two countries are opposing each other.<sup>68</sup> The United States seeks a preservation of the status quo in matters of security, while the U.S.S.R. is consistently seeking a revision.<sup>69</sup> But in the United Nations the United States has favored a "loose construction" of the Charter in furtherance of its own security, while

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<sup>67</sup>Edward Buehring, "The United States, The United Nations, and Bi-Polar Politics", International Organization, IV, 4 (November, 1950), p. 576.

<sup>68</sup>Joseph E. Johnson, "The Soviet Union, The United States and International Security", International Organization, III, 1 (February, 1949), p. 7.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 2.



the Soviet Union has insisted on a "strict construction" in furtherance of its security.<sup>70</sup> While both nations gain from membership in the United Nations, the United Nations, because of these basic differences in concepts and attitudes, becomes only another arena where power politics are played. The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States are permanent members of the Security Council shows that power politics cannot be contained within the limits of the Charter.<sup>71</sup>

It can also be seen from the Greek case that the United Nations is not equipped to take action in an international civil war, and it is not equipped to take action if one great power is backing a smaller nation in any dispute. The great powers are not willing to delegate supreme authority to settle disputes to an international body. Such a delegation of authority might be detrimental to national interests and might mean the abandonment of basic concepts of belief.

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 11

<sup>71</sup>Buehring, P. 581.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO SECURITY AND UNANIMITY

#### Soviet Security Objectives

The conclusions from this analysis of security concepts in regard to unanimity are rather easy to discern. The Soviet leaders feel that security can be best achieved by an expansion of both the Soviet Union and Communism. Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, made this statement regarding Soviet policy:

Soviet policy is based on entirely different principles, on basically new principles. Its main function is to secure peace for the peoples of the Soviet land, and to create external political conditions which are necessary for their peaceful, creative work.<sup>1</sup>

Stalin himself had said that the Russian revolution resulted in the establishment of the "first proletarian dictatorship" which was to be "a powerful and open base for the world revolutionary movement."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet leaders realized that this Soviet expansion could not come about through peaceful means<sup>3</sup> alone and that wars to attain this expansion, therefore, were not to be considered as unjust,<sup>4</sup> can be

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<sup>1</sup>Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 32, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., No. 31, pp. 22-23, quoting Stalin, On the Problems of Leninism, (1928)

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., quoting Short History of the Communist Party.



found in the various writings of the Soviet leaders, in the writings published under Soviet government auspices,<sup>5</sup> and in the writings of various students of International Russian policy.<sup>6</sup> The Soviets are strict adherents to the idea that

he who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, he who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, and he who rules the World-Island rules the World.<sup>7</sup>

Such statements are borne out by Soviet action. The Soviet government seeks to expand the influence of Russia and Communism in several ways. The Soviets expand their influence by giving economic, military and moral support to those underdeveloped nations and groups which are willing to spread Communist doctrine. The setting up of the Comintern, Cominform, and the backing of Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian guerillas in Greece are but three examples of how the Soviet Union, by supporting nations and groups within its sphere of influence,<sup>8</sup> seeks to expand. The Soviet Union also seeks to expand by bringing the smaller nations within the Soviet sphere of influence, by claiming that the Soviet Union is vitally interested in the protection of national sovereignty, and by claiming that the Anglo-Americans

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., quoting Bolshevik.

<sup>6</sup>Historicus", "Stalin on Revolution", Foreign Affairs, XXVII (January, 1949), pp. 175-214. See also Mintauts Chakste, "Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty", AJIL (January, 1949)

<sup>7</sup>Bemis, p. 463, quoting H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York, 1919).

<sup>8</sup>The Korean affair showed how the U.S.S.R. militarily supported its satellite neighbors and how the U.S.S.R. gave political and moral support to those nations in the United Nations.



are an imperialist bloc. The proposals of the Soviet government in the thirties for total disarmament and the proposal of the Soviet government to prohibit the use of atomic weapons are other examples of how the U.S.S.R. hopes to gain the support of the smaller nations.

Concurrent with the objectives of the Soviet government to expand the influence of the U.S.S.R. and Communism for security reasons is the objective of protecting Russian sovereignty from outside interference and influence. Soviet demands for unanimity among the big powers in the Security Council shows how Russia sought to prevent the smaller nations from taking any action detrimental to Soviet sovereignty and security. This unanimity principle, carrying with it the right of veto, could also prevent any other big power or combination of powers within the Security Council from making any decision or taking any action detrimental to Soviet security.

The policies of expanding Soviet-Communism while preventing other nations from entering the Soviet sphere of influence were combined in Russian attempts to build various balances of power. The proposals of the Soviet government for total disarmament would have enabled the U.S.S.R. to build a favorable balance of power in the economic and political fields while preventing other nations from using armed force to enter the Soviet sphere. Soviet action in the League was aimed primarily against a Germany threatening Soviet security.

Soviet use of the absolute unanimity principle in the League, was a means of preventing any League action detrimental to Soviet vital interests. When the attempt to use the League failed the U.S.S.R. sought its objectives of expansion without retaliation by other means.



The taking of territory from Finland, the absorption of the Baltic states, and the division of Poland with Germany were all for the purpose of expanding Great Russian Chauvinism.

During and after the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union insisted on unanimity among the big powers as a balance against a resurgence of power on the part of her enemy. Unanimity also prevented decisions and actions detrimental to Soviet vital interests from being taken by the Security Council in the United Nations. The Soviet Union, however, did not rely on the unanimity principle alone to protect its vital interests. With the creation of the various "People's Republics", with the retention of Soviet armed force, and by fomenting civil wars throughout the world the Soviet Union has sought to build balances of power which would allow her to expand while protecting the Soviet sphere from ideas, influences, and armed forces detrimental to Soviet sovereignty and security.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for total disarmament of conventional weapons and the prohibition of the atomic bomb are examples of how the Soviet Union sought to gain equality in the military field while gaining superiority in the economic field. The Soviet demand for the retention of the unanimity principle also shows how that country protects its sovereignty by preventing discussion, investigation, and enforcement in the Security Council on matters which might jeopardize Soviet security. The gaining of equality in some fields while gaining superiority in others is a planned policy, and not just happenstance, on the part of the Soviet



government. This can be seen by examining statements made by Soviet leaders and their spokesmen.<sup>9</sup>

Soviet actions in the United Nations have shown that the U.S.S.R. wants the United Nations to be used as a balance against resurgent enemy powers threatening Soviet security but it is unwilling to allow the United Nations to become an anti-Soviet coalition. Soviet actions in the United Nations also show that the U.S.S.R. is attempting to break the balance of power held by the Western bloc, and that the Soviet Union is attempting to convince not only the people within its own orbit, but others that the U.S.S.R. is not an aggressor nation. Thus the unanimity principle has become for the Russians yet another means of seeking objectives of expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviets are also interested in retaining the unanimity of the Big Four for this means the retention of the veto. With the use of the veto, the Soviets can prevent any action which might jeopardize Soviet policy and vital interests at any time.

#### American Security Objectives

Although the United States has no such doctrinaire principles or statements on which to base foreign policy, this analysis of the development and subsequent breakdown of the unanimity principle leads to several conclusions concerning American foreign policy. The primary purpose of American foreign policy is to protect the United States. One objective, therefore, of American policy is to halt any moves threatening American supply lines. The Lend-Lease program, the Anglo-

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<sup>9</sup>  
Security Council, Official Records, Fifth year, No. 31,  
pp. 22-23.



British "alliance" of 1941, the declaration of war against Germany were all designed to protect the supply lines of America in the North Atlantic. Present United States adherence to N.A.T.O. is for the same purpose. It was for the purpose of protecting American interests in the Mediterranean and Near East that America extended aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine.

To further protect America's position, the American government has from its founding, sought to protect the Western hemisphere from attack. The Monroe Doctrine with all its corollaries was an outgrowth of this objective. The promulgation of the "Good Neighbor" policy and the delineation of security zones around the Western hemisphere at the outset of World War II were just other aspects of strengthening the Monroe Doctrine. When the United States found that it could not hope to protect the Western hemisphere with the loss of British naval power, the United States entered into World War II.

It was for the purpose of using a collectivity of nations to protect the Western hemisphere and, in particular, the United States that America has tried to block Communist expansionist moves throughout the world as was done in Greece.<sup>10</sup> It was to protect American security by blocking Soviet expansionist moves that the Marshall plan was engineered.

Present-day America has found it necessary to join in alliances which will further protect American supply lines throughout the world and which will further protect the Western hemisphere from attack. To protect the American supply lines in the North Atlantic

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<sup>10</sup> [And as is now being done in Vietnam.]



area from German attack during World War II was one of the reasons why the United States was willing to become a partner of the Grand Alliance.

The United States, as did the U.S.S.R., had hoped that the Grand Alliance and its continuation after the war in the Security Council of the United Nations could be used as a balance of power against a resurgent Germany. It was for this purpose and for the purpose of protecting American sovereignty that the United States adhered to the unanimity principle. When it became clear, however, that Soviet actions inside and outside the United Nations threatened American security, the United States began to build a balance of power against the Soviet Union. A military and economic balance of power was created by the United States with the creation of the European Recovery Program. A balance was upheld in the Near East with the granting of United States aid to Greece and Turkey.

A further attempt on the part of the United States to build a balance of power within the framework of the United Nations occurs as the United States attempts to show the smaller nations that their interests are linked with those of the United States as the United States attempts to build a solid bloc of world opinion against the Soviet Union.

American actions in the United Nations show that America, too, is not adverse to using the United Nations to gain national objectives. American peace and security can be promoted by gaining



world moral backing and thus creating a bloc against Soviet moves.<sup>11</sup> The United States, to further halt Russian expansionist moves threatening American security, has extended aid outside the framework of the United Nations to those countries which have been engaged in shooting wars with countries or groups under Soviet domination. Such was the case when the United States acting under the Truman Doctrine sent arms and military missions to Greece, Korea, and now Vietnam. The United States has, with the approval of the majority of Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, sent arms and troops to countries which are engaged in halting the expansion of Soviet satellites.<sup>12</sup>

It becomes clear, therefore, that if American concepts of security coincide with Soviet concepts of security the unanimity principle will be adhered to by the United States. If American security, however, becomes endangered by Soviet action, the United States will seek to break loose from its adherence to the unanimity

<sup>11</sup>Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 17, p. 12. Statement by Warren Austin in the Security Council in regard to the Korean question, June 30, 1950:

. . . and that, above everything else, the great value of what we are witnessing and participating in today is the moral power of united public opinion, and that it may be strong enough to bring peace without the shedding of more blood.

Also Ibid., No. 39, p. 15. Statement by Ernest Gross in the Security Council in regard to the Korean question on September 7, 1950.

<sup>12</sup>Of., New York Times, June 30, 1950, p. 1. The statement of Secretary of State Acheson in regard to American action in connection with the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, made it quite clear that United States action in support of the authority of the United Nations was taken to support the existing status quo in the Pacific area.



principle. If American security interests are endangered by constant application of the veto, then American leaders are not adverse to putting a limitation on that use.<sup>13</sup>

The United States was able to get around Soviet use of the "double" veto in the Greek case by sending that case to the General Assembly by suggesting that the case be removed from the agenda of the Security Council.<sup>14</sup> The very fact that the United States wanted the General Assembly to discuss the matter shows that the United States was trying to have the case settled to its advantage unhampered by the Soviet use of the veto.

#### Conclusions in Regard to the Principle of Unanimity

History has shown that no important unanimous decisions among all the members of the League were possible, for there were too many fundamental conflicts and varieties of interests not only between the smaller and larger powers, but among the great powers themselves. It was thought that unanimity among the Big Four could be achieved in the United Nations and so it might have been if there had been another power endangering the security and sovereignty of the Big Four. But with the Big Four themselves in fundamental conflict, there can be no unanimity and, subsequently, no action on the part of the United Nations acting as an independent agent.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Cf., International Organization, V, 1, 68. The Acheson "Uniting for Peace" proposals are an attempt on the part of the United States to limit the Russian use of the veto so as to enable the United States to halt Communist expansion in the Pacific and in other areas where such expansion might endanger United States supply lines and security.

<sup>14</sup>Security Council, Official Records, First Year, Second Series, No. 89, p. 2404.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., Fifth Year, No. 15ff.



Power politics played outside the United Nations of necessity enters the United Nations, for each great power only seeks another arena where it can expand its influence. The Greek case points out the fact that no enforcement action can be taken by the United Nations in an international civil war, and no enforcement action can be taken against a smaller nation if one of the great powers supports that smaller nation. In other words, the United Nations is incapable of establishing a balance of power in favor of one group of nations or another and is incapable itself of acting as a third force to settle important differences among the big powers.

At the present time it does not seem likely that any international organization will be given supreme authority because the great nations are not willing to place their security in the hands of another body. When these nations, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, are willing to delegate supreme authority to a world organization, or are willing to forego the playing of power politics in the international field, will there be any likelihood for peace, security, and unanimity among nations.



## APPENDIX

Statement of the American Position on Voting in the Security Council as  
Read by Secretary of State Stettinius at the Third Formal Meet-  
ing of the Crimea Conference<sup>1</sup>

1. Review of the Status of the Question

It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consultation for future settlement. Of these, the principle one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegates thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continued extensive study by each of the three governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals read as follows:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decision on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VII, Section C, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

2. Analysis of the American Proposal

- (a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for the unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of the peace, including all military and enforcement measures.
- (b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a

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<sup>1</sup>Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1949), pp. 140-143; U.S. Department of State, The Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 735.



matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state should have the right to present its case. We believe that, unless this freedom of discussion is permitted in the Council, the establishment of a World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from a tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

(c) Reasons for the American Position

From the point of view of the United States Government, there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure. First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world. Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States that there be a provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization both large and small.

We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshall Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

It is our earnest desire that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President's proposals.



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